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A DUTY TO MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS
AND A DEFENSE OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT
DOCTRINE IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW
Laya Sleiman*
INTRODUCTION

In 1997, five women brought a class action against the Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") claiming that
SEPTA's physical fitness test, which applicants were required to pass
in order to be eligible for employment, had a discriminatory effect on
women.1 The plaintiffs satisfied all administrative requirements for
positions as transit police officers, but failed the "physical entrance
requirement of running 1.5 miles in 12 minutes or less."'2 On average,
only twelve percent of women passed the running test, while almost
sixty percent of men passed the test.'
Using these statistics as
evidence, the women argued that the running test had a
disproportionately adverse effect on women.
As Judge Weis noted in his dissent, the record tended to show that
the plaintiffs did not make good faith efforts to pass the running test.4
An expert witness testified that the average woman could pass the
running test "with only moderate training. ' 5 In addition, videotapes
showed some of the female applicants walking "at the halfway point,
either because they were indifferent or unable to run for even that
short a period of time."6 Despite this evidence that the plaintiffs and
other members of their class did not make good faith attempts to pass
the running test, the Third Circuit permitted the plaintiffs' claim to
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor
Peter Siegelman for his guidance and insight, to my family for their love and support,
and to Jessica Malak for everything.
1. Lanning v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 494 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding
that business necessity did not justify SEPTA's running test, which had a disparate
impact on women, because it did not measure the minimum qualifications necessary
for successful performance of a transit officer), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1131 (2000).
2. Id. at 484.
3. Id. at 482-83.
4. Id. at 495 (Weis, J., dissenting).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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stand and remanded the case to the district court for further
consideration.7
The plaintiffs in Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority brought their employment discrimination

claim under the disparate impact doctrine.'

Disparate impact is a

theory of liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9

which allows plaintiffs to prove employment discrimination by
showing that a "facially neutral" employment practice when applied
"result[s] in a significantly discriminatory hiring pattern."'" Disparate
impact can be applied to a wide variety of practices, such as ability

and

intelligence

tests,

education

requirements,

work

history

requirements, arrest records, credit history, and height, weight, and
strength requirements."'"
An employment practice that has a

significant discriminatory impact constitutes illegal employment
discrimination unless the defendant employer can prove that the
employment practice is "job related for the position in question and

consistent with business necessity."12

The defining feature of disparate impact is
showing of a significant discriminatory effect. 3
treatment, also a theory of liability under Title
to show that the employer considered race,

that it requires only a
Conversely, disparate
VII, requires plaintiffs
color, national origin

and/or sex in its decision-making process. 4 Plaintiffs can make a
prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing that the employer
7. Id. at 494.
8. Id. at 485.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment,.., because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
10. Lanning, 181 F.3d at 485. See generally 2 Lex K. Larson, Employment
Discrimination § 20 (2d ed. 1994).
11. Larson, supra note 10, § 20; e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)
(challenging a height and weight requirement); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975) (challenging standardized intelligence tests); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (challenging, inter alia, an educational requirement); Walls v.
City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990) (challenging arrest record and credit
history requirements); Eison v. City of Knoxville, 570 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Tenn. 1983)
(challenging a physical ability test).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
13. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 ("But Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.").
14. See EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1994)
(affirming summary judgment in favor of the school whose hiring practices the EEOC
claimed had a disparate impact on older applicants under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); see also Larson, supra note 10, § 20.03.
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had a discriminatory intent or took action based on the consideration

of the "impermissible factors" listed above. 5 Therefore, "liability
depends on whether the protected trait ...actually motivated the
employer's decision.' 1 6 Disparate treatment was the primary theory
of liability under Title VII until the Supreme Court created the
disparate
impact theory in the "seminal case,"' 7 Griggs v. Duke Power
18
Co.

The theory of disparate impact has been hotly debated since first
recognized by the Supreme Court in Griggs in 1971.19 Legal scholars

and practitioners initially argued over whether the theory was proper
and/or intended under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.20 In 1991,
Congress mooted this debate by codifying the disparate impact
doctrine in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.1 However, codification did

not quell the controversy.
Debate over the theory of disparate impact still thrives. Tension
arises because employment discrimination laws paradoxically embody
two competing conceptions of equality:2 the colorblind vision, which
15. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (holding
that the employer only bears the burden of production, not persuasion, when giving
its non-discriminatory reason for rejecting plaintiff); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (holding that the lower court should have considered the
plaintiff's argument regarding the proper geographic region to include in the relevant
labor market analysis); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)
(holding that Title VII permitted the maintenance of seniority systems even though
the employer discriminated against African-Americans before the passage of Title
VII).
16. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609-10 (1993).
"'Disparate
treatment... is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer
simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion [or other protected characteristics.] Proof of discriminatory motiv[e] is
critical ....' Id. (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15).
17. Lanning v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 485 (3d Cir. 1989).
18. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that Title VII prohibits employment practices
that have a discriminatory effect on a protected group, even in the absence of
discriminatory intent).
19. Id.
20. See Michael Evan Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems,
and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a
Recommendation for Reform, 7 Indus. Rel. L.J. 429 (1985) (arguing that Title VII was
not intended to allow liability for employment discrimination without finding an
intent to discriminate); Katherine J. Thomson, The Disparate Impact Theory:
CongressionalIntent in 1972-A Response to Gold, 8 Indus. Rel. L.J. 105 (1986).
21. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 104-105, 105 Stat. 1074-75
amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2 (1964)).
22. George Rutherglen, Employment Discrimination Law: Visions of Equality in
Theory and Doctrine 56-57 (2001); see also William J. Kilberg, Editor's Letter, The
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 17 Employee Rel. L.J. 531 (1992) (describing the "central
paradox in antidiscrimination employment law [as] the prohibition of discriminatory
intent coextensive with the exercise of that intent to remedy the remnants of past
disadvantage"); Michael Souzzi, Letter to the Editor, Supreme Court on Civil Rights,
L.A. Times, June 21, 1989, at 116. "When we speak of equal employment opportunity
we insist on clear and specified objectivity. But when we couple this with so-called
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claims that employers should not look to race, color, national origin or

sex, but rather individual merit and qualifications in employment and
promotion practices,

23

and the remedial vision, which claims that the

law must acknowledge race, color, national origin and sex in order to
remedy past injustices and achieve equality in employment.24
Critics of disparate impact argue that the theory is at odds with a
merit-based system, and leads to the establishment of quotas.

According to this view, quotas force employers to focus on an
individual's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" rather than
individual qualifications. 26

Both the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and

1991 purport to stand against hiring and promotion practices that are
based upon impermissible classifications. 7 Opponents of the theory
argue that while disparate impact may not have been intended to
cause the implementation of quotas, quotas are the inevitable result of
a theory that finds employment discrimination partially or wholly on

the basis of the statistical makeup of an employer's workforce.28
Further, if an employer does not institute quotas, it may be held liable

for many other factors not within its control, such as quality of
education and lack of financial resources that may have led to the
statistical disparity.29
affirmative action, we simultaneously insist that subjective decisions on the person's
race or gender or ethnicity shall prevail. In other words, we are in a hopelessly
contradictory situation .... Id.
23. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(setting forth a colorblind vision of the law in the civil rights context); Richard A.
Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of
Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 25 (interpreting the Constitution to require
that classifications not be made based on race).
24. E.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978). "In order to
get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in
order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently." Id; see
Rutherglen, supra note 22, at 56-57.
25. See Robert H. Bork, The Supreme Court and Civil Rights, Wall St. J., June 30,
1989, at A12 (arguing that the Supreme Court made only minor and necessary
changes to disparate impact law in 1989).
26. See Mona Charen, The Supreme Court Discovers Common Sense, S. F. Chron.,
July 2, 1989, at Z6 (claiming that quotas lead to the hiring of unqualified people); see
also Souzzi, supra note 22 ("[P]referential hiring and preferential treatment on the
basis of gender and ethnic or racial background should not be tolerated.").
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2003) (mandating that no preferential treatment
should be given to any individual or group based on race, color, religion, sex or
national origin because of a statistical imbalance in a particular workforce); see also
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 434-35 (1971).
28. Rosemary Alito, DisparateImpact Discrimination Under the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. 1011, 1011-13 (1993). "While quotas are consistently rejected
in principle as a means to equal employment opportunity, they have become an
accepted fact of litigation. Racial/ethnic/sexual composition of a workforce may be
probative-and at times determinative-of a claim of illegal employment
discrimination." Id. at 1012.
29. See Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Deconstructing Disparate
Impact. A View of the Model Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 325, 353-55
(1996). Paetzold and Willborn argue that "[t]he law treats the employer's criterion as
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Proponents of disparate impact argue that the theory is essential to
prevent discrimination in employment.30 Under a remedial vision of
equality, individuals' status as members of historically disadvantaged
groups is acknowledged in order to achieve equality.3 This view
charges that critics of disparate impact incorrectly fail to consider
historical, social and economic factors that stand as barriers to the
achievement of "conventional badges of accomplishment," such as
educational degrees.3 2 These barriers, which exist in the pre-labor
market, prevent equalization of outcomes by race, color, national
origin and sex.33
Each side of the debate recognizes that intentional discrimination is
wrong. However, discrimination may exist without an intent to
discriminate and proving the intent to discriminate today, especially in
the context of subjective employment practices, is often very difficult,
if not impossible.34 Thus, one argument for disparate impact is that it
shows intentional discrimination vis-A-vis its effects.3
Statistical

inequalities may be used to prove employment discrimination without
showing either intent to discriminate or that race, color, national

origin and/or sex were used in the employer's decision-making

process.36
This Note defends the theory of disparate impact by narrowing its
the cause of a disparity, even though it may be only one of a wide array of factors
necessary to produce the disparity." Id. at 353-54.
30. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and
Subjective Judgments, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1 (1987) (arguing that Title V11 has
become a powerful force in social progress because of the Supreme Court's creation
of disparate impact in Griggs).
31. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
32. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433; see, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and
Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-Based College Admissions, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1029
(2001) (defending university admissions based on socioeconomic status as consistent
with notions of meritocracy); Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of
Equal Employment Opportunity, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 587 (2000) (arguing that
employment discrimination is more subtle in the modern workplace, therefore courts
should not require plaintiffs to show evidence of more explicit and traditional forms
of discrimination); see also Nicole J. DeSario, Note, Reconceptualizing Meritocracy:
The Decline of DisparateImpact DiscriminationLaw, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 479
(2003) (contending that current judicial conceptions of merit are flawed and therefore
weaken disparate impact law).
33. See Lawton, supra note 32, at 599-612.
34. See Dawn Bennett-Alexander, The Use of Disparate Impact Analysis in
Subjective CriteriaEmployment DiscriminationCases: All that Glitters Isn't Gold?, 12
Nat'l Black L.J. 189, 194-96 (1993) (discussing subjective hiring criteria and
evidentiary standards in disparate impact law).
35. This argument acknowledges that disparate impact is also important in cases
where the employer did not have any intent to discriminate and did not consider the
applicant/employee's race, color, national origin or sex in his or her decision-making
process.
36. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (illustrating that even though an
employer can prove it had no intent to discriminate, the employer may still be found
liable under the disparate impact theory).
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scope, and accounting for the argument that the theory does not
adequately focus on merit, while acknowledging the historical, social,
and economic factors that can prevent equal access to employment
opportunities.3 7
The theory of disparate impact can thus be
strengthened and made more defensible if it is improved to allow for
recovery only when plaintiffs have put forth reasonable efforts (in
light of the circumstances and surrounding conditions) to comply with
an employer's hiring criteria. The scope of disparate impact should be
narrowed, but only so far as is necessary to prevent plaintiffs who fail
to demonstrate reasonable efforts to meet an employer's hiring
criteria from recovering under the theory. As it stands, disparate
impact law is vulnerable to attack because plaintiffs have the potential
to hold employers liable without themselves putting forth reasonable
efforts to comply with the hiring criteria at issue.38
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of disparate impact law
and its development. Part II examines the argument that disparate
impact is unable to deal justly with situations in which plaintiffs
prevail without having made reasonable efforts to meet employment
criteria. Part II also presents three different formulations of the duty
to make efforts and discusses several possible methods of allocating
the costs of such a duty. Using the facts of three important disparate
impact cases, Part III tests the formulations of the duty to make
efforts presented in Part II. Part III then lays out four possible
implementations of the duty to make reasonable efforts. In light of
the formulations as applied, Part III proposes that plaintiffs be
required to make reasonable efforts (in light of the circumstances) to
meet the hiring requirement at issue. This duty takes into account
some concerns of disparate impact critics, while acknowledging the
necessity of disparate impact to combat the historical, social, and
economic barriers to equality in employment opportunity.
Defendants should bear the costs of the duty to make reasonable
efforts if they are found liable. The duty should be incorporated into
the present disparate impact model by allowing defendants to contest
the accuracy of plaintiffs' statistics based on plaintiffs' failure to make
reasonable efforts. In support of this proposition, Part III shows that
the duty to make reasonable efforts is consistent with similar
mitigation duties in other areas of the law, as well as the original
formulation of the disparate impact doctrine laid out in Griggs.

37. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
38. See Lanning v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 494-505 (3d Cir. 1999)
(Weis, J., dissenting).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT DOCTRINE AND
ITS DEVELOPMENT

A. Griggs and the Development of the DisparateImpact Doctrine
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,39 the Supreme Court developed the
theory of disparate impact, which allowed plaintiffs to prove
employment discrimination based on statistical evidence of disparate
effects without showing that the employer had a discriminatory
intent. 4° The Court held that "[t]he [Civil Rights] Act [of 1964]
proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation."4 1 Under this theory,
plaintiffs can prevail if they show that employment or promotion
practices had adverse consequences or effects on a protected class,
even if the employment practices are neutral on their face and there is
no suggestion of any discriminatory motive by the defendant.42
In Griggs, African-American employees at a Duke Power Company
("Duke") plant in North Carolina brought a class action under Title
VII alleging that Duke's hiring and promotion practices had a
discriminatory effect on African-Americans.43
According to the
district court, before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became effective,
Duke had overtly "discriminated on the basis of race in the hiring and
assigning of employees."' The power generating plant consisted of
five departments, of which the Labor Department was ranked lowest
in pay. 45 The other four departments consisted entirely of white
employees.4 6 In 1965, Duke began to require a high school diploma in
order to transfer from the Labor Department to a higher
department.4 7 Also in 1965, Duke began to require that all new hires
into any department other than the Labor Department pass "two
professionally prepared aptitude tests" in addition to having a high
school diploma.48
The Supreme Court found for plaintiffs, holding that Title VII did
not require a showing of discriminatory intent.49 In doing so, the
39. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
40. Id. at 432 ("Congress directed the thrust of the [Civil Rights] Act [of 1964] to
the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.").
41. Id. at 431.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 425-26.
44. Id. at 426-27.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 427-28. It was not disputed that white employees who were promoted
from the Labor Department prior to the institution of the high school diploma
requirement performed adequately in their new positions despite their not having a
diploma. Id. at 427.
49. Id. at 432.
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Court laid out the model of disparate impact liability.5"

This

framework consists of two stages.5" The first stage is plaintiffs' prima
facie case, in which plaintiff must show that an employer's hiring
and/or promotion requirements have a discriminatory effect on the

basis of race or "other impermissible classification.15 2 Upon plaintiffs'
successful showing of a prima facie case, the second stage shifts the
burden53 to the defendant employer to prove "business necessity."5 4

The Supreme Court explained that, "[t]he touchstone is business
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude
Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited."55 The Court found that the requirements in

question resulted in African-Americans being disqualified from
employment and promotion at a "substantially higher rate than white

applicants."5' 6 In addition, defendants did not prove that these
requirements were "significantly related to successful job
performance";57 therefore, the Court found for plaintiffs.58
After Griggs, the disparate impact doctrine continued to develop59

and

became

an

important

tool

for

fighting

employment

discrimination.' However, in 1989 the Supreme Court decided an
important disparate impact case that significantly altered the doctrine.

50. Id. at 431.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 432.
54. Id. at 431. Further, "Congress has placed on the employer the burden of
showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the
employment in question." Id. at 432.
55. Id. at 431.
56. Id. at 426.
57. Id.
58. Additionally, the court considered these factors against the backdrop of a long
history of intentional discrimination. Id.
59. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), decided shortly after
Griggs, the Supreme Court refined this new theory and added a final stage, which
allowed the plaintiff, after the defendant had successfully shown business necessity, to
prove that the employment practices were "merely [] a 'pretext' for discrimination."
Id. at 425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973)).
A plaintiff could provide evidence of pretext by "show[ing] that other tests or
selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the
employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship."' Id.
(quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801). The Court clarified Griggs, stating
first that the "complaining party or class [must make] out a prima facie case of
discrimination" by showing that the employment practices "in question select
applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of
the pool of applicants." Id. (internal citation omitted). Once the plaintiff makes his or
her prima facie case, the employer bears the "burden of proving that its tests are 'job
related."' Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). The third stage is rarely
an issue, as the litigation does not usually progress past the first two stages.
60. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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B. Wards Cove "Tip[s] the Scale in Favorof Employers, 61
In 1989, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio 62 critically changed the

theory of disparate impact, leading to a doctrine more favorable to

employers.63 Civil rights advocates condemned the decision, calling it

a major setback.'
The dissent lamented that the majority had
"[t]urn[ed] a blind eye to the meaning and purpose of Title VII,...
perfunctorily reject[ing] a longstanding rule of law."65 The majority
did not claim to overrule any case, but only to "address[]... disputed
questions of the proper application of Title VII's disparate impact

theory. '66 However, some commentators claimed that Wards Cove
had effectively overturned Griggs.67
In Wards Cove, a class of racial minority current and former
employees of two seasonal salmon canneries brought a Title VII

action against the canneries claiming that a number of the employers'
practices created a racially stratified workforce and prevented
minority employees from being employed in higher ranked positions.68
The two defendant companies, who operated their canneries in
remote areas of Alaska, divided their workforce into two main groups:

"cannery jobs," which were "unskilled" and held by minority
employees, and "noncannery jobs," which were varied, generally
skilled, paid more, and held by white employees. 69 The employees
lived and ate in separate quarters according to their position.7 °
The Supreme Court held that plaintiffs did not prove their prima

facie case because they misused statistics in attempting to show
disparate impact.7 1 A showing that there is a racial imbalance in the
workforce did not, on its own, make a prima facie case of employment

61. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 673 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
62. Id. at. 642.
63. See Scott H. Kremer, The Restructuring of DisparateImpact Analysis-Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 25 New Eng. L. Rev. 959 (1991) (arguing that the
Supreme Court went too far in attempting to prevent disparate impact from causing
employers to institute quotas).
64. See Editorial, A Civil Rights Setback, Boston Globe, June 9, 1989, at 16;
Editorial, A Step Backward: Supreme Court Delivers Blow to Minorities, Seattle
Times, June 10, 1989, at A19; Julianne Malveaux, That Sign Is Up Again: 'No Blacks
Need Apply', USA Today, June 8, 1989, at A10; Kathleen Taylor, Letter to the
Editor, Power to the Powerful; Tough Luck to Everyone Else, Seattle Times, June 21,
1989, at A7.
65. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 650.
67. See, e.g., A Civil Rights Setback, supra note 64, at 16 ("The [Wards Cove]
decision is nearly a reversal of a 1971 decision in the case of Griggs v. Duke Power
Co."). Some critics agreed with the Supreme Court's contention that it did not
overrule any prior disparate impact cases. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 25.
68. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 647-48.
69. Id. at 647.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 650.
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discrimination.72 The Court held that evidence of racial stratification
along the lines of cannery and noncannery positions is insufficient
because the "proper comparison [is] between the racial composition
of [the at-issue jobs] and the racial composition of the qualified...
population in the relevant labor market, '73 except when the statistics
for the relevant labor market are "impossible to ascertain."7 4 The
Court held that this method of statistical analysis was appropriate to
prevent employers from being subject to litigation simply for having a
workforce that was "racially imbalanced."7 5
Wards Cove made at least two critical changes to the theory of
disparate impact, both of which favored employers. First, the Court
held that after the plaintiff has made a prima facie case, the defendant
has only the burden of production in justifying its employment
practice, while the plaintiff continues to bear the burden of
persuasion. 76
The Court also relaxed the business justification
requirement.77
While earlier cases had focused on "business
necessity"78 and "requirements...
essential to good job
performance,, 79 the Court declared that the "touchstone of this
inquiry is a reasoned review of the employer's justification" and that
the justification need not be "essential" or "indispensable."8 Some
commentators argued that the Supreme Court made these changes,
which favored employers, in order to prevent the establishment of
quotas. s1 However, Congress quickly stepped in to correct the Court's
interpretation of Title VII.
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Congress'sResponse to Wards Cove
In late 1991, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
added a new subsection to Title VII, amending section 703 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.82 Congress responded to the recent Supreme
72. Id. at 653.
73. Id. at 650 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308
(1977)).
74. Id. at 651.
75. Id. at 652.
76. Id. at 660.
77. Id. at 671-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
79. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977).
80. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
81. Id. at 652; see Kremer, supra note 63, at 979-80.
82. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (2000). The amendments read
in pertinent part:
(k)(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this title only if(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity; or
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Court decisions that weakened Title VII protections, especially Wards
Cove, and sought "to strengthen and improve Federal civil rights
laws," in order to "expand[] [their] scope... [and] to provide

adequate protection to victims of discrimination."83 Proponents of the
Act claimed that it was a step forward for civil rights and improved
disparate impact in a much-needed way,' by making the doctrine
more friendly to plaintiffs." Some critics of the Act argued that the
bill, despite its sponsors' claims, created incentives for and may even

require employers to implement quotas (to avoid litigation).86 Other
critics have argued that even if the Act were an improvement for
plaintiffs, the Act and judicial interpretations of it did not do enough
to secure equality in employment under a remedial vision of
equality.87

Under the Act, a plaintiff may prove unlawful discrimination if she
can show a disparate impact based on an impermissible classification
and if the defendant fails to show that a practice is "job related" as
well as "consistent with business necessity. 88 Importantly, the Act fails

to explain what type of statistics are needed to show a disparate
impact, and also fails to define "job related" and "business necessity,"
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and
the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.
(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice
causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the
complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged
employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the
complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a
respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for
analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment
practice.
(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does
not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to
demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity.
(C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in
accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the
concept of "alternative employment practice."
Id.
83. 137 Cong. Rec. S15,273 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991). The Act also limited its
legislative history to only two paragraphs, thereby making unavailable the great
amount of compromise and discussion that was involved in the passage of the Act. See
generally C. Boyden Gray, DisparateImpact: History and Consequences, 54 La. L.
Rev. 1487 (1994) (discussing the controversy surrounding the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, especially on the issues of quotas and damages).
84. Michael K. Frisby, Civil Rights Bills Seen Needed to Remedy Job Bias, Boston
Globe, May 23, 1991, at 16.
85. E.g., Reprise of Civil-Rights Bill: Another New Fight Begins for Fairness,Not
Quotas, Seattle Times, May 19, 1991, at A18.
86. E.g., Linda Chavez, This Civil Rights Bill Would Add More Bias, USA Today,
May 16, 1991, at A12; Paul Craig Roberts, Playing Quota Games, Wash. Times, Mar.
7, 1991, at G3.
87. See generally DeSario, supra note 32.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
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creating a debate surrounding their meaning." The Act does clarify
that the fact that the employer need not show business necessity if it
can show that there is no disparate impact. 90 However, the plaintiff
may win even after the employer satisfies its burden under the
business necessity defense by proving that there is another
employment practice that is available to the defendant and that (1)
this alternative does not have a discriminatory effect and (2) the
employer failed to adopt it. 91
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified Wards Cove in part and
overruled it in part.92 The Act codified the causation requirement laid
out in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust93 and made law of the
finding in Wards Cove that the plaintiff, as part of her prima facie
case, must establish that "each particular challenged employment
practice causes a disparate impact." 94 However, the Act leaves open
the possibility that "the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as
one employment practice" in the case that the plaintiff "can
demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent's
decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis." 95
In addition, the Act overruled Wards Cove by placing the burden of
production and persuasion on employers to show business necessity.96
Plaintiffs would not have to bear the burden of persuasion with regard
to the defendant's justification for the disparate impact.
D. Principlesin Modern Enforcement: The EEOC'sFour-FifthsRule
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, plaintiffs must show a statistical
disparate impact in order to establish a prima facie case of disparate
89. The interpretive memorandum states that business necessity should be defined
according to Supreme Court cases from Griggs up to, but excluding, Wards Cove,
however these cases are not consistent as to what business necessity means. 137 Cong.
Rec. S15,273 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991). Some cases presented a more relaxed
requirement, while others presented a more stringent requirement. See Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating that the "touchstone is business
necessity"). But see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (requiring only
that the requirements be "job related").
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii).
91. See id. § 2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
92. See Alito, supra note 28, at 1017.
93. 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988). This causation requirement was not part of the
holding of the Court because this section was written by Justice O'Connor, and joined
only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Scalia. Id.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i).
95. Id. This exception to the causation requirement may be important for a
plaintiff attempting to prove that an employer's subjective employment practices are
unlawfully discriminatory. See Alito, supra note 28, at 1017.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000). The Act also overruled Wards Cove
by allowing a plaintiff to show the employer refused to adopt an "alternative
employment practice" that complies with the law that existed on June 4, 1989, the day
before the Wards Cove decision came down. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), 2(k)(1)(A),
2(k)(1)(C).
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impact. 97 There are "no bright line rules.., to guide courts in
deciding whether plaintiffs' statistics raise an inference of
discrimination, [however,] several overarching principles inform the
issue."98 The most important 'principle is the four-fifths rule. 99
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),
which creates the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures, created the "four-fifths rule," which states that "[a]
selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than fourfifths (4/5 or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest
rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies
as evidence of [disparate] impact, while a greater than four-fifths rate
will generally not be regarded ... as evidence of [disparate]
impact. '' " However, this rule does not foreclose the possibility that a
disparity less than eighty percent can constitute evidence of disparate
impact. 1' Under the four-fifths rule, if the pass rate for a particular
group is less than eighty percent of the pass rate for others, this
difference in pass rates presents evidence of a disparate impact.10 2
For example, the statistics in Lanning were based on a percentage
of the women who passed the running test
compared to the
10 3
percentage of men who passed the running test:
Equation 1

Pass Rate for Women

Number of Women Test Passers
Number of Women Test Takers

Pass Rate for Men

Number of Men Test Passers
Number of Men Test Takers

These percentages are calculated by dividing the number of women
who passed by the number of women who took the test.
The following illustrates the operation of the EEOC's four-fifths
rule, using the equation above and a fact pattern similar to that in
Lanning.1 If one hundred men took the running test and seventyfive of these men passed the test, the men would have a pass rate of
97. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A); see also Larson, supra note 10, § 21.01.
98. Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs'
statistics were flawed and therefore inadequate to prove employment discrimination
under either the disparate treatment or disparate impact theories of liability).
99. E.g., Mems v. City of St. Paul, 224 F.3d 735, 740-41 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of the St. Paul Fire Department on plaintiffs' disparate
impact claim based on a written examination).
100. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2003).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Lanning v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 482-83 (3d Cir. 1999).
104. Id. at 481-83.
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seventy-five percent. If 100 women took the running test and fifty of
them passed the test, the pass rate for these women would be fifty
percent. The pass rate of women (fifty percent) would therefore be
sixty-six percent of the pass rate for men (seventy-five percent). The
pass rate of women is less than four-fifths (or eighty percent) of the
pass rate for men. Therefore, these statistics show evidence of a
disparate impact under the EEOC's four-fifths rule.15
Table 1: Example of the Operation of the Four-Fifths Rule
Men

Women (Overall)

# Taking

100

100

# Passing

75

50

Pass Rate

75%

50%

Relative Pass vs. Men

50/75

-

66%

In light of the central role that statistics and the EEOC's four-fifths
rule play in establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact, it is
important that statistics accurately reflect plaintiffs' ability to meet a
hiring requirement. As discussed below, Judge Weis's dissent in
Lanning implicitly calls into question the ability of the present
disparate impact model to ensure the accuracy of plaintiffs' statistics.
II. SHOULD A DUTY TO MAKE EFFORTS BE INCORPORATED INTO
THE DISPARATE IMPACT DOCTRINE?

Part I begins by analyzing Judge Weis's dissent in Lanning, which
implies that plaintiffs should have a duty to take the steps within their
power to meet a hiring requirement before they may sue based on
that requirement. Part II then lays out three possible formulations of
the duty to make efforts, a duty which is implicated in Judge Weis's
dissent. Finally, Part II looks at several possible ways of allocating the
costs of a duty to make efforts.
A. Judge Weis's Dissent in Lanning
Judge Weis's dissent in Lanning'0 6 suggests-without explicitly
stating-that plaintiffs should be subject to a requirement that
obligates plaintiffs to take the steps within their power to meet an
employment requirement before they may win a disparate impact
claim based on that employment requirement. 17
105. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D).
106. 181 F.3d at 494.
107. Id. at 501. There being no other literature calling for such a duty, Judge
Weis's dissent in Lanning is the sole source of the duty to make efforts proposed in
this Note.
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In Lanning, five women who satisfied administrative requirements
but were denied employment brought a class claim of disparate
impact under Title VII against SEPTA, the mass transit authority for
the Philadelphia area."'8 They claimed that SEPTA's physical fitness
screening test, which required applicants to run one and one-half
miles in twelve minutes, had a disparate impact on women. 10 9 The
statistics showed that on average only twelve percent of women
passed the test, while almost sixty percent of men passed. "0 SEPTA
conceded that the screening test had a disparate impact on women;
however, they argued that the test was justified by business
necessity.'1 1 The district court ruled in favor of SEPTA based on its
belief that the relationship of aerobic capacity to the essential duties
of a SEPTA officer justified the implementation of the physical fitness
tests.112 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case,
holding that under the business necessity defense, "a discriminatory
cutoff score on an entry level employment examination must be
shown to measure the minimum qualifications necessary for successful
performance of the job in question" to escape disparate impact
liability under Title VII. l 3
Judge Weis dissented, arguing that the "minimum qualifications"
criteria of business justification do not apply in circumstances where
public safety is at issue.11 4 However, critical to Judge Weis's dissent is
the fact that the record showed that "a smaller percentage of female
applicants passed the running test than males, but that nearly all
women who trained for it were able to pass.""' 5 Judge Weis pointed
out that "[t]he named plaintiffs and some of the class members who
failed demonstrated, for the most part, a 'cavalier' attitude towards
the running test.""1 6
Judge Weis discussed videotapes, which
demonstrated that some of the applicants were walking, rather than
running, at the halfway point either out of fatigue due to a lack of
training or indifference. " 7
SEPTA even sent the applicants
correspondence that included recommended training techniques,
108. Id. at 481, 484.
109. Id. at 483.
110. Id. at 482-83.
111. Id. at 484.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 481. Lanning exemplifies a rigorous version of the business necessity
defense. See David E. Hollar, Comment, Physical Ability Tests and Title VII, 67 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 777, 794 (2000) (proposing a two-prong test for courts to use in analyzing
the business necessity defense, especially in the context of physical ability tests).
114. Lanning, 181 F.3d at 494. He argued that in this case, because public safety
was at stake, the burden placed on SEPTA should have been lighter in terms of
justifying their hiring criteria. Id.
115. Id. at 495. A physiologist testified that only "moderate" training was needed
for the average woman to pass. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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which were testified to be adequate. 118 Judge Weis pointed out that
the "cavalier" approach of some of the female applicants exaggerated
the extent of the disparity between the pass rates of the genders. 1 9
Thus, Judge Weis argued that "where applicants have it within their
power to prepare for the running test, they may properly be expected
to do so."' 2 ° His argument is that the plaintiffs should have a duty to
make efforts 21 to meet the hiring requirement at issue by taking the
steps within their power to pass the test. The broader application of
this dissent is to suggest that all plaintiffs should have an obligation to
take the steps within their power to prepare for an employment test or
requirement in order to win a disparate impact claim based on that
test or requirement.
The dissent in Lanning could provide a strong platform upon which
disparate impact critics may stand. 2 2 Is it in the interest of justice to
allow plaintiffs to recover under the theory if they have not even
made reasonable efforts to meet a requirement? How can a court
determine if the running test had a disparate impact on plaintiffs if it
cannot determine whether it was the terms of the running test or
simply plaintiffs' lack of effort that resulted in their failure? Should
Title VII be used to require employers to hire applicants who do not
make good faith attempts to pass the screening tests? How much
confidence could an employer have in such a workforce? In an effort
to answers these questions, Part II.B. explores possible formulations
of the duty to make efforts and ways to allocate its costs.
B. Defining the Duty to Make Efforts and Allocating Its Costs
Drawing from Judge Weis's dissent, the duty to make efforts could
be defined in a number of ways. The way in which the duty is
ultimately defined affects plaintiffs, for it dictates what measures are
required in meeting particular hiring requirements and may be
determinative of their claims. The definition may also affect plaintiffs'
incentive to take the steps within their power to meet hiring
requirements. The definition of the duty will also be important to
employers. If the duty is defined stringently, plaintiffs will be less
likely to win disparate impact cases and employers will have more
leeway to devise tests without considering their impact on applicants.
This section presents three possible formulations for the duty to
make reasonable efforts and outlines distinctions that exist among
them: (1) no duty at all; (2) an absolute duty to make efforts; and (3)
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 501.
121. This exact terminology is not found in Judge Weis's dissent in Lanning.
Rather, the author developed it from the ideas implicit in Judge Weis's dissent.
122. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of
disparate impact).
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a duty to make reasonable efforts in light of historical, social and
The section also examines possible
economic circumstances.
allocations of the costs that a duty to make reasonable efforts would
entail and touches upon the policy issues as they relate to the central
paradox embedded in the disparate impact doctrine. 23 This paradox
involves focusing on individuals' race, color, religion, sex and/or
national origin in an attempt to create a system of equal employment
does not consider individuals' status as members of
opportunity that
124
these groups.
Importantly, each of the formulations of the duty will be tested for
just results2 5 by applying it to the facts and hiring requirements in the
following cases: the high school diploma requirement in Griggs,26 the
height and weight requirements in Dothard v. Rawlinson,'2 7 2and the
twelve minute, one and one-half mile running test in Lanning.11
1. No Duty to Make Efforts
The first possibility is simply not to have a duty to make reasonable
efforts. Plaintiffs would not be required to take any steps to comply
with a hiring requirement regardless of how easy or difficult it would
be to do so. However, this standard leaves disparate impact theory
susceptible to an attack by opponents who would prefer that hiring
reflected a system of pure meritocracy, 29 in which each individual is
rewarded based on their past "conduct" and personal "attributes."' 30
Without a duty to make reasonable efforts, plaintiffs who make little
or no effort to meet a hiring requirement may still be successful and
receive damages in a disparate impact claim challenging that
requirement. In contrast, merit-based hiring would reward individuals
for their past achievements and allow employers to make predictions
about job success based on past performance."' Critics argue that a
departure from merit leads employers to institute quotas, and to hire

123. See supra notes 22-36 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the
debate.
124. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
125. With these models in mind, Part III.A. uses "test suites" in an attempt to
clarify and give examples of the application of each possible formulation of the duty
to make reasonable efforts. See Eugene Volokh, Test Suites: A Tool for Improving
Student Articles, 52 J. Legal Educ. 440 (2002) (proposing that students writing law
review notes use test suites to ensure the soundness of their proposals).
126. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text for the
facts of the case.
127. 433 U.S. 321, 323-30 (1977).
128. 181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999). See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text for
the facts of the case.
129. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
130. See Banks, supra note 32, at 1036.
131. Id. (discussing merit in the college admissions context, which is analogous to
the employment context).

2694

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

applicants or promote workers who simply are not the best qualified
13 2
(as evidenced by their lack of effort to meet the requirement).
Proponents of merit hiring would have a strong claim that there are
other applicants who are able to fulfill the requirement and would be
better qualified for the job (in terms of capability and/or motivation,
133
as evidenced by their pre-test efforts to meet the requirement).
Merit hiring rewards applicants for their achievements, effort and
motivation.13 4 According to this view, one who tries harder to meet
hiring requirements is more deserving and should be treated more
favorably than one who does not.1 35 Such a rule encourages selfimprovement and productivity. 36
Disparate impact absent a duty to make reasonable efforts may also
be open for attack on the grounds that it results in misleading
statistics. Absent a duty to make reasonable efforts, there is a
potential for plaintiff's statistics, which are used to show a prima facie
case of disparate impact,'37 to be misleading. When plaintiffs'
statistics show that a particular group did not meet a hiring
requirement in disproportionate numbers to other groups, it may be
difficult to determine whether this statistical disparity resulted from
the employer's unfair hiring requirement, or from plaintiffs' failure to
take steps to meet that requirement. 138 In some cases, these statistics
may be so misleading that they show a disparate impact where they
would not have if the plaintiffs had made efforts to meet the hiring
requirement at issue. This situation would arise if the plaintiff and
other members of his or her group failed to make efforts to meet the
requirement and thus failed in higher numbers than any other group.
In this case, the statistics may show a disparate impact; however, this
showing of disparate impact would be a result of plaintiff's lack of
effort rather than the employment requirement.
2. An Absolute Duty to Make Efforts
The duty to make efforts could be defined as a duty to take all of
the steps within one's power to meet the hiring criteria at issue. Thus,
if it is within one's power to take such steps, regardless of how difficult
those steps may be to take, one must take them in order to bring a
132. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. Some proponents of the
disparate impact theory claim "'quotas' have become merely the current political
code word for those who always have opposed the protection of civil rights." Kent
Spriggs, Title VII Arguments Rang False, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 29, 1993, at 13.
133. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
134. See Banks, supra note 32, at 1043 ("This approach ties one's deservingness to
the contribution to social productivity represented by one's performance.").
135. See infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
136. See Banks, supra note 32, at 1043.
137. See supra notes 52, 89 and accompanying text.
138. E.g., Lanning v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 494-505 (3d Cir. 1999)
(Weis, J., dissenting).
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successful disparate impact claim. This formulation of the duty is
most consistent with notions of meritocracy. Meritocracy is a social
system, which distributes "privileges, power, wealth, and status, as
well as the opportunity to acquire them ...according to merit."' 3 9
Merit is determined by individuals' "conduct" or "attributes."' 40 In a
meritocratic system, past achievements are seen as indicators of future
In this way, a meritocratic system rewards
performance.14'
individuals' past achievements. 142 Thus, a meritocracy promotes
"productivity[] to the extent that it distributes opportunities and
resources based on143predictions of future performance," which benefits
society as a whole.
The absolute duty to make reasonable efforts is consistent with
meritocracy because those who best meet the hiring requirement
would get the job, regardless of any unfavorable conditions (for which
the applicant was not responsible). Those who make efforts to meet a
hiring requirement would be most deserving of the job because those
applicants are most likely to perform well in the future and they
should be rewarded for their past efforts.'" Those who do not make
efforts to meet the requirement, and subsequently fail, should not be
given the job because they were not the most able or motivated
(regardless of any historical, social, or economic barriers they faced in
taking steps to meet the requirement). 45 A system of meritocracy
defined in this way would consider performance in terms of the1 4hiring
6
(Of
requirement, not the amount of effort one put into meeting it.
course, effort at meeting the hiring requirement may well correlate
with success in doing so.)
In addition, this definition of the duty would begin to answer the
concerns of critics of disparate impact who feel that the theory leads
to quotas, which prevent hiring on the basis of merit.'4 7 However, this
formulation of the duty fails to account for the social, historical and
economic forces that perpetuate discrimination, for which the

139. Robin West, ConstitutionalFictions and MeritocraticSuccess Stories, 53 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 995, 1011 (1996) (defining meritocracy, but arguing that it does not
function properly in our society).
140. See Banks, supra note 32, at 1036.
141. Id.; see also DeSario, supra note 32, at 485.
142. See Banks, supra note 32, at 1039-40.
143. Id. at 1036.
144. Meritocracy "ties one's deservingness to the contribution to social productivity
represented by one's performance. Deservingness corresponds to, and arises from,
one's contribution." Id. at 1043.
145. Under an absolute duty to make efforts, those applicants who make efforts
and nevertheless fail to meet the hiring requirement would be permitted to bring a
disparate impact claim based on that hiring requirement.
146. See Banks, supra note 32, at 1043 (explaining the performance-contribution
account of deservingness).
147. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
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disparate impact theory was designed to account. 148 This definition
may be both more economically efficient and easier for courts to
administer than other possibilities because it only requires a
determination of what steps were within a plaintiff's power to take. It
does not require an in-depth look at historical, social and economic
forces that may affect one's efforts in meeting a hiring requirement.
Regardless of whether an applicant was ultimately able to meet a
hiring requirement, an absolute duty to make efforts would require
that the applicant take all possible steps to meet a hiring requirement
in order to bring a successful disparate impact suit based on that
hiring requirement.
3. A Duty to Make Reasonable Efforts in Light of Surrounding
Circumstances
The absolute duty to make efforts could be tempered by requiring
plaintiffs to make good faith efforts to take only the steps to meet a
requirement that are reasonably within their power in light of
historical,social and economic circumstances. Thus, the duty to make
reasonable efforts would require that plaintiffs take reasonable steps
to meet the hiring requirement at issue in order to win their disparate
impact case. 149 This obligation would strengthen the disparate impact
theory from the perspective of critics who claim that the theory does
not adequately account for notions of merit.150 However, this
definition of the duty also considers the historical, social and cultural
forces that can act to perpetuate past discrimination and prevent
minorities and women from taking steps to meet a hiring requirement,
although it is technically within their power to do so."'
A duty to make reasonable efforts provides protection against the
possible injustice of plaintiffs winning without having made
reasonable efforts. However, it still accounts for situations in which it
is technically, but not practically within one's power to make efforts to
meet a hiring requirement. Under the duty to make reasonable
efforts, the effort required of plaintiffs would be balanced against the
difficulty of taking steps to meet that requirement. Accounting for
the difficulty a particular group would have in meeting a hiring
requirement would account for some of the historical, social and
economic barriers that members of protected groups face.152 Hiring
criteria could be analyzed on a spectrum with immutable
characteristics at one end and criteria with which it is relatively easy to
comply (due to the absence of historical, social and economic barriers)
148.
149.
not for
150.
151.
152.

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
The duty to make reasonable efforts would look at what steps were reasonable
the individual, but for the average member of the plaintiff's protected group.
See supra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Lawton, supra note 32, at 599-612.
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The requirement would not be as stringent as the

absolute duty to make reasonable efforts because its aim would be to
protect against the unjust results of a plaintiff recovering when he or
she has not made a good faith effort to meet that requirement in light

of the situation. This formulation of the duty may not be as easy to
administer as the absolute duty, which is more bright-line and requires
less inquiry into surrounding circumstances. However, it would have
the benefit of taking the prevailing historical, social and economic

situations of a protected group into consideration.
As disparate impact doctrine now stands, it does not consider
factors other than the particular employment practice at issue in
accounting for disparate impact.153 For example, in Griggs the
plaintiffs challenged the high school diploma requirement because it
disqualified African-Americans at a "higher rate" than whites.'54 In
this example, the court would only look to the employer's diploma
requirement to explain the disparate impact and not, for example, at

the historical and socioeconomic factors that prevented the plaintiffs
from having the same access to and quality of education that whites
had. 55 An important consideration in this formulation would be the
extent to which courts would be willing and able to delve into the
social, historical, and economic issues facing plaintiffs.

Another critical consideration in the application of a duty to make
reasonable efforts would be determining what is "reasonable" within

the meaning of the rule. Extraordinary efforts are not reasonable, but
the line between extraordinary and reasonable efforts may be difficult
to draw.'56 Is taking a particular step reasonable based on evidence
153. See Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 29, at 353-55 (maintaining that the
causation element in disparate impact cases fails to consider external social factors).
However, the justification or aim of the disparate impact theory does account for
historical, social and economic barriers to equal employment opportunities.
154. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425 (1971).
155. See Paetzold & Willborn supra note 29, at 353-54.
156. Courts consider a similar issue in the context of the duty to mitigate damages
in employment discrimination cases: whether one who has been discharged or denied
employment has to take different or inferior work to mitigate his or her damages.
E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982) ("Although the
unemployed or underemployed claimant need not go into another line of work,
accept a demotion, or take a demeaning position, he forfeits his right to backpay if he
refuses a job substantially equivalent to the one he was denied."); Meacham v. Knolls
Atomic Power Lab., 185 F. Supp. 2d 193, 218-19 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). The district court
stated:
An employee discharged as the result of discrimination has an obligation to
attempt to mitigate her damages by using reasonable diligence in finding
other suitable employment. An employee's duty to mitigate is not onerous
and does not require that an employee actually find other employment. On
this issue, a defendant bears the burden of proving (1) that suitable work
existed, and (2) that the employee did not make reasonable efforts to obtain
it. In considering other employment, a discharged employee need not go into
another line of work, accept a demotion, or take a demeaning position....
The ultimate question is whether a discharged employee acted reasonably in
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that others are able to take it, and if so how many others: five
percent, fifty percent, or ninety percent? The more strictly a court
defines reasonable, the more the reasonable duty begins to look like
the absolute duty. Reasonableness may best be defined on a case-bycase basis by examining the difficulties members of protected groups
face in taking those steps. This analysis cannot be exact or scientific.
The interests at stake are: (1) ensuring that employers do not
maintain employment requirements that have an adverse impact on
members of a particular group, and (2) ensuring that plaintiffs do not
unjustly hold employers liable for failing to meet a hiring requirement
that they were reasonably capable of meeting.
4. Allocation of Costs
Any imposition of a duty to make reasonable efforts would create
additional costs resulting from the requirement that plaintiffs take
steps to meet a hiring requirement.'5 7 Therefore, a definition of the
duty to make reasonable efforts should include an allocation of those
costs. This section considers two possibilities for allocating the costs
of the duty to make reasonable efforts: first, the employer should
bear the cost of the duty to make reasonable efforts if the employer is
found liable; and second, the applicant should bear the costs of the
duty to make reasonable efforts regardless of the employer's liability.
Generally, applicants bear the costs of the steps that they must take
to obtain employment. That general rule would continue to apply
5 8 This rule
when an employer is not found liable for disparate impact."
applies even though it results in different costs for different people
depending on how much effort the individual must make to meet an
employment requirement.'5 9
However, the general rule that applicants bear their own costs
might not be appropriate when an employer is found liable for
disparate impact. If the plaintiff incurred costs in taking steps to meet
an employment requirement, which disproportionately disadvantages
him or her, then the employer arguably should bear those costs
because those costs were either unnecessarily high or unnecessary in
general. The central justification for imposing those costs would be
attempting to gain other employment or in rejecting proffered employment.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
157. Any additional expenditure of time, money or effort that an individual makes,
results in costs to that individual.
158. The duty to make reasonable efforts need not disturb the usual distribution of
costs absent liability.
159. For example, an applicant who applies for a position at a company at which he
or she has an employed relative might not have to incur the costs involved in
interviewing numerous times, etc. However, an applicant with no contacts at the
company may have to send a number of r~sum6s and attend a number of interviews.
That applicant, therefore, incurs greater cost in getting the same position. However,
some inequity is generally accepted as an unavoidable reality.
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the employer's liability. It may be that the employer should only bear
the applicant's additional costs above those of other applicants
proportionately based on the disadvantage the requirement entailed.
Or perhaps, the employer's liability justifies its bearing the entire cost
of plaintiff's seeking that employment.
The duty to make reasonable efforts may also be defined to require
that applicants bear the costs of obtaining employment regardless of
the employer's liability. This definition would be based on the general
rule that applicants bear their own costs in seeking employment. The
general rule entails disparities in the costs that applicants bear, which
are not necessarily fair or equal. If the general rule accepts these
disparities, then perhaps the rule should not be changed in the context
of employer liability. The plaintiff would have had to incur costs
regardless of the disparate impact and it may not be practical to
determine which of the costs the plaintiff bore disproportionately or
unnecessarily.
Given that there are a number of possible formulations of the duty
to make efforts and several ways to allocate its costs, Part III argues
that the theory of disparate impact should be strengthened and
improved by implementing a duty to make reasonable efforts, which is
best defined as a duty to make reasonable efforts and that the
employer should bear the costs of this duty only in the event that the
employer is found liable for employment discrimination.
This
requirement would prevent plaintiffs from bringing successful
disparate impact claims without making reasonable efforts to meet the
hiring requirements at issue, thereby helping to ensure that
employment practices are merit-based, while still accounting for
important societal factors that prevent equal access to employment
opportunities.
III. A DUTY TO MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS AND A STRONGER
AND MORE DEFENSIBLE DISPARATE IMPACT DOCTRINE

Part III begins by testing the formulations of the duty to make
efforts detailed in Part II. Part III then presents four possible
methods of implementing the duty to make efforts. Part III proposes
that a duty to make reasonable efforts should be implemented in
disparate impact law as a tool for defendants to use in contesting
plaintiffs' statistics. In defense of this proposal, Part III shows that the
duty to make reasonable efforts will strengthen the disparate impact
doctrine by helping to ensure both that plaintiffs' statistics accurately
reflect plaintiffs' ability to meet hiring requirements and that hiring is
merit-based. Finally, Part III demonstrates that the duty to make
reasonable efforts is consistent with similar mitigation duties in other
areas of the law and with the original formulation of the disparate
impact doctrine laid out in Griggs.
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A. Testing Different Formulationsof the Duty to Make Efforts
This section tests the three definitions of the duty to make efforts
described in Part II. 6 Each formulation of the duty to make efforts
62 and
will be applied to the hiring requirements in Griggs,'6 ' Dothard,'
63
Lanning.
The purpose of running these tests is: (1) to determine
which formulations of the duty to make efforts yield results which are
most compatible with the goals of Title VII and the disparate impact
doctrine; ' (2) to clarify these formulations of the duty to make
efforts; 165 and (3) to demonstrate their applications using specific
examples. 66
1. Testing the Status Quo: No Duty to Make Efforts
Absent a duty to make efforts, the courts in each of the three cases
discussed above would likely reach the same decision. 167 In Griggs,
the plaintiffs would not have needed to show that they made efforts to
obtain a high school diploma. Thus, the court would have been able
to find, as they did, that the high school diploma requirement had a
negative and disproportionate effect on African-American employees
and applicants,' 68 and that Duke did not have a legitimate business
169
justification for the requirement.
In Dothard, Rawlinson would not have to show that she made
efforts to meet the height and weight hiring requirements. Thus,
absent a duty to make efforts, the court would probably conclude, as it
did, that the height and weight requirement had an adverse impact on
women and that the defendant did not meet her burden of showing a
70
business necessity.'

160. See supra Parts II.B.1.-3.
161. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text for the
facts of the case.
162. 433 U.S. 321, 323-30 (1977). In Dothard, a woman (Rawlinson) brought a
class action against the Alabama Board of Corrections after being denied
employment as a prison guard for failure to meet the weight requirement. Id. at 32425. Rawlinson claimed that the height and weight requirements for prison guards had
a disparate impact on women because the requirements would exclude over forty
percent of women, but only one percent of men. Id. at 329-30. The Alabama Board of
Corrections required prison guards to be above five feet, two inches tall and to weigh
in excess of 120 pounds. Id. at 327. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's
holding that under Title VII, the height and weight requirements could not be applied
to the plaintiff and her class. Id. at 331-32.
163. 181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999). See supra notes 1-7, 109-20 and accompanying
text for the facts of the case.
164. See Volokh, supra note 125, at 442.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See infra tbl. 2 (Summary of Test Suites Results).
168. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,425-26 (1971).
169. Id. at 426.
170. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977).
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Without a duty to make efforts, the women plaintiffs in Lanning
would win their disparate impact claim. These women would not have
to show that they made efforts to pass the running test. Despite
evidence that these women did not make a good faith effort to train or
to pass the test when taking it, 171 and despite evidence that almost
everyone who trained for the test was able to pass it, 172 their disparate
impact claim would be successful. Regardless of the plaintiff's failure
to train, the court would likely find that the running test had a
disparate impact on women 173 and that SEPTA
was unable to show a
74
legitimate business necessity for the test.
2. Testing the Absolute Duty to Make Efforts
Application of the absolute duty to make reasonable efforts to the
facts in Griggs would require that the plaintiffs in that case take all of
the steps within their power to obtain a high school diploma. 175 This
formulation of the duty would not take into account the surrounding
circumstances. If it were shown that it was possible for an AfricanAmerican to obtain a high school diploma in North Carolina in the
1950s and 1960s, then plaintiffs would be expected to take the steps
within their power to obtain a diploma, regardless of the degree of
difficulty, or fail in their disparate impact claim.
Obviously, it was possible, at least in a technical and/or legal sense,
for an African-American to graduate from high school in North
Carolina during the period in which the plaintiffs lived. However, it is
clear that there existed powerful historical, social and economic
barriers to such an accomplishment. 176 In Griggs, the record showed
that at least one African-American working at the power plant had
obtained a high school diploma. 177 Thus, under the strictest version of
a duty to make reasonable efforts, plaintiffs' claims in Griggs likely
would have been barred, since they presumably could have attended
high school and thereby negated the disparate impact of the plant's
high school graduation requirement.
In Dothard, it was clearly not within plaintiff's power to meet the
height requirement, as height is an immutable characteristic.
However, under the absolute duty to make reasonable efforts, it
seems that it was within the plaintiff's power to gain weight sufficient

171. Lanning v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 495 (3d Cir. 1999).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 483.
174. Id. at 481.
175. See infra tbl. 2 (Summary of Test Suites Results).
176. See generally 2 Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem
and Modern Democracy 887-93, 942-52 (1996) (giving an account of the status of
African-Americans with regard to education).
177. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427 n.2 (1971).
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to meet the weight requirement. 7 8 Thus, the plaintiff would not have
been able to make out a successful claim without showing that she did
all that which was within her power to meet the weight requirement,
regardless of how difficult
it would have been for her actually to
1 79

achieve the standard.
Under an absolute duty to make efforts, the plaintiffs in Lanning
would have been barred from recovery due to the evidence that it was
within their power to train to pass the running test and that they failed
to do so. 180 Plaintiffs were given information regarding training
techniques and the record showed that nearly every woman who
trained was able to pass."' This absolute duty to make efforts would
not have required that they passed the test, only that they took all of
the steps within their power to pass it, which they failed to do.
3. Testing the Duty to Make Reasonable Efforts
A duty to make reasonable efforts may have more palatable results
82
than the absolute duty when applied to the specific facts in Griggs.1
It would be unjust to insist that the plaintiffs did not make reasonable
efforts to comply with the high school graduation requirement, taking
into consideration the practical infeasibility of African-Americans,
living in the South in the 1950s and 1960s, obtaining high school
diplomas.18 3 Thus, under the duty to make reasonable efforts,
plaintiffs would not be required to take steps to obtain a diploma if
not reasonably within their power. To determine reasonableness,
courts might look to the difficulty that African-Americans in general,
and the individual plaintiffs in particular, faced in obtaining a high
school diploma. 1" Courts might look at such factors as the quality of
178. Although people can generally gain weight, it may not have been the
applicant's weight that mattered to the defendant. Rather, the defendant was
concerned with strength and possibly the appearance of strength. Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977) (stating that the defendant argued that the height
and weight requirements "have a relationship to strength, a sufficient but unspecified
amount of which is essential to effective job performance as a correctional
counselor"). If the weight requirement had been higher, the plaintiff had been
required to gain a great deal of weight and did, and if that weight was not
proportionate to her muscle mass, then although the letter of the requirement would
be met, the purpose of the requirement-strength-would not.
179. See infra tbl. 2 (Summary of Test Suites Results).
180. See supra notes 5-7, 106-20 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
182. See infra tbl. 2 (Summary of Test Suites Results).
183. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487-88 n.1 (1954)
("[African-American] schools were inferior with respect to teacher training, pupilteacher ratio, extracurricular activities, physical plant, and time and distance involved
in travel.").
184. The duty to make reasonable efforts is concerned with how reasonable it
would be for a particular individual or class to take steps to meet a hiring
requirement, not how difficult it would be for that individual or group in comparison
to others.
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early education that African-Americans had access to as well as the
number of African-Americans who actually obtained high school
diplomas during this time.
As applied, the duty to make reasonable efforts has built-in
flexibility that accounts for the passage of time and changing social
conditions. For instance, if Griggs were retried today, it is quite
possible that a court would find a high school diploma requirement to
be reasonable, even if it were true that African-Americans had lower
high school graduation rates than other groups.185 A court might also
find that plaintiffs were required to make reasonable efforts to meet
this requirement.
An analysis of Dothard would require more facts to determine
whether the plaintiff took reasonable steps to meet the weight
requirement.1 6 If, for instance, the plaintiff weighed 117 pounds, it

might not have been unreasonable to require her to make good faith
efforts to gain three pounds to meet the weight requirement of 120
pounds. If however, the plaintiff weighed only 100 pounds and had a
very high metabolism, it may have been unreasonable to require that
she take the extreme measures needed to meet the requirement in
that instance. 8 7 In that situation, the plaintiff would only be required
to take reasonable, not extreme steps to meet the 120-pound weight
requirement. The plaintiff would be required to take the steps that
would be reasonable for most women to take to meet the weight
requirement. 188 Again, the duty would not require her to gain the
weight necessary to meet the requirement; it would only require her
to make a reasonable effort to do so. If Rawlinson made reasonable
efforts to meet the weight requirement and failed, then she would not
be foreclosed from bringing a successful disparate impact claim. Her
claim would proceed under the current disparate impact model. It
would then be left to the court to determine whether the weight
requirement had a disparate impact on women189 and if so, whether
business necessity justified the weight requirement.'
Clearly, there
are no reasonable steps the plaintiff might have taken to meet the
height requirement.
185. Courts would determine reasonableness on a case-by-case basis by considering
how difficult it would be for a protected individual or group to take steps to meet the
hiring requirement, not how difficult it would be when compared with other
individuals and groups.
186. See infra tbl. 2 (Summary of Test Suites Results).
187. It is important to note that this inquiry does not reach whether it was proper
to impose such a requirement, but only whether plaintiff made a good faith effort to
meet the requirement before bringing a successful disparate impact claim.
188. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 52 and accompanying text for the requirements for showing a
prima facie case of disparate impact.
190. See supra notes 53-55, 88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
business necessity defense available to employers after the plaintiff has shown his or
her prima facie case.
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On the other end of the spectrum from the height requirement in
Dothard would be requirements such as the running test in Lanning,
in which it was within the plaintiffs' ability to pass without
extraordinary efforts. Thus, it would be reasonable in light of the
circumstances to require that the plaintiffs make good faith efforts to
pass the running test.191 Evidence showed that a minimum amount of
training was required and plaintiffs were advised as to training
techniques.192 If the plaintiffs passed the running test and met the
other requirements, presumably SEPTA would award them the job.
If the plaintiffs did not make reasonable efforts and failed, they would
be foreclosed from bring a successful disparate impact claim. If the
plaintiffs made reasonable efforts and still failed the test, they would
be able to bring a claim under the present disparate impact model and
the court would determine whether the test had a disparate impact on
women and if so, whether business necessity justified the test. 193 The
duty might mean that women would be required to train harder or
longer than men, who, studies showed, needed to do less training to
pass the test. 194 The possible inequity in such a situation would be
tempered by the reasonableness requirement of the duty because it
would only impose on female applicants an obligation to do a
reasonable amount of training in light of their physiological
disadvantage. 95 Although they might, therefore, have to train harder
than men, they would not be required to train unreasonably hard. 96

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See infra tbl. 2 (Summary of Test Suites Results).
See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
See Lanning v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478,483 n.5 (3d Cir. 1999).
Id.
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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Table 2: Summary of Test Suites Results
No Duty to Make Efforts

Absolute Duty to Make
Efforts
Result: Plaintiffs lose.
Rationale: Plaintiffs did
not show that they made
all possible efforts to
obtain a high school
diploma; therefore,
plaintiffs' disparate
impact case could not
proceed.

Griggs

Result: Plaintiffs win.
Rationale: Plaintiffs
need not show that they
made efforts to obtain a
high school diploma. The
high school diploma
requirement had an
adverse impact on
African-Americans and it
was not justified by
business necessity.

Dothard

Result: Plaintiff wins.
Rationale: Plaintiff was
not required to show that
she made reasonable
efforts to meet the height
and weight requirements,
which were shown to
have an adverse impact
on women and which
were not justified by
business necessity.

Result: Plaintiff loses.
Rationale: Plaintiff did
not show that she took
all possible steps to meet
the weight requirement;
therefore, she loses her
disparate impact claim,

Lanning

Result: Plaintiffs win.
Rationale: The plaintiffs
were not required to
show that they made
reasonable efforts to pass
the running test. The
running test had an
adverse impact on
women and was not
justified by business
I necessity.

Result: Plaintiffs lose.
Rationale: The evidence
showed that plaintiffs did
not do everything they
could to train for the
running test; therefore,
plaintiffs lose their
disparate impact claim,

Duty to Make
Reasonable Efforts
Result: Plaintiffs win.
Rationale: Plaintiff show
that they made
reasonable efforts to
obtain a high school
diploma in light of the
surrounding historical,
social and economic
circumstances in North
Carolina in the 1950s and
1960s. The requirement
had an adverse impact on
African-Americans and
was not justified by
business necessity.
Result: Plaintiff wins or
loses.
Rationale: More
information would be
needed to determine
whether the plaintiff
made reasonable efforts
to meet the weight
requirement. If it were
found that she did make
reasonable efforts, she
would win as the weight
requirement had an
adverse impact on
women and the
defendant did not prove
that it was required by
business necessity.
Result: Plaintiffs lose.
Rationale: The evidence
showed that plaintiff did
not make reasonable
efforts to pass the
running test; therefore,
they could not proceed
with their disparate
impact claim.

B. Implementing the Duty to Make Efforts
Once the duty to make efforts has been defined, it must be
implemented. This section will consider the consequences of four
possible ways of integrating the duty to make efforts into the disparate
impact model: (1) by contesting plaintiff's statistics; (2) by class
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certification in class actions; (3) by creating a duty for plaintiff to
plead and prove; and (4) by creating a defense for defendant to plead
and prove.
1. Incorporating the Duty to Make Efforts into the Present Disparate
Impact Model
This section will consider two ways of incorporating the duty into
the present disparate impact model. This method has the advantage of
not requiring legislation or court action to change the model.
Furthermore, the duty would not need to be litigated in situations
where it was not a material issue.197
a. Contesting Plaintiffs Statistics
The duty to make reasonable efforts could be implemented into the
current model by allowing defendants to contest the plaintiff's
statistical evidence of disparate impact during the first stage of
litigation.19 As discussed above, the duty to make reasonable efforts
helps to ensure the accuracy of plaintiff's statistics. 99 The defendant
would be able to argue that plaintiff's statistics are inaccurate, as they
present a pass rate that is artificially low, and therefore that the
comparison between the pass rate of the plaintiff's group and the pass
rate of others is misleading.
Absent a duty to make reasonable efforts, it is possible that the fifty
percent pass rate of women in the example above is the result of the
women's failure to make efforts to train to pass the running test.2"
Thus, perhaps the baseline number in the equation2 "1 above should
not be the number of women who took the test, but the number of
women who actually tried or made reasonable efforts to pass the test.
For example, imagine that of the one-hundred women who took the
test, only thirty of them made reasonable efforts to pass the running
test. 2 Then, the relevant pass rate for women would be seventy

197. It would be inefficient and futile to require the parties to litigate this issue in a
situation in which it was clear that the plaintiffs had fulfilled their duty to make
reasonable efforts, either because the requirement at issue involved an immutable
characteristic or because the record was clear as to the fact that plaintiffs had met
their obligation.
198. See Larson, supra note 10, § 23.02.
199. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 200-06 and
accompanying text.
200. See supra tbl. 1 (Example of the Operation of the Four-Fifths Rule).
201. See supra Equation 1.
202. See infra tbl. 3 (Illustration of the Possible Effect of the Duty to Make
Reasonable Efforts on Plaintiff's Statistics).
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percent because twenty-one women passed 2the
test out of the thirty
03
who made reasonable efforts to pass the test.
Table 3: Illustration of the Possible Effect of the Duty to Make
Reasonable Efforts on Plaintiff's Statistics
Men

Women (Overall)

Women (Making

100
75
75%

100
50
50%
50/75 = 66%

30
21
70%
68/75 = 93.3%

Reasonable Effort)
#Taking
# Passing
Pass Rate
Relative Pass vs. Men

The percentage may prove to be higher (the percentage will never
be lower) and therefore closer to the percentage of men who passed.
This redefinition of the baseline may even eliminate a showing of
disparate impact as it does in this example.2 4 The pass rate for
women (sixty-eight percent) is 90.7%, which is more than four-fifths
(or eighty percent) of the pass rate for men (seventy-five percent).
Thus, these statistics would not constitute evidence of a disparate
impact under the EEOC's four-fifths rule.2 °5
Absent a duty to make reasonable efforts, plaintiffs may use
misleading statistics to show their prima facie case. Imposing this duty
could lead to more accurate statistics by giving plaintiffs further
incentive to take steps to meet hiring requirements. The statistics
might prove more accurate in that they will reflect the applicants true
ability to meet a hiring requirement. This statistical "accuracy" allows
courts to find liability only where disparate impact is the result of the
employer's hiring requirements, not plaintiffs' failure to comply.
Mitigation duties in tort and contract law function similarly, in that
they give the plaintiff incentives to take steps to assure that the
defendant's damages reflect the true result of the harm he or she
caused, rather than injuries the plaintiffs caused or exacerbated.2 6
This implementation of the duty is analogous to the market
definition issue in disparate impact cases, which is frequently an
important issue in this first stage of litigation. 2 7 Therefore, the duty
203. See infra tbl. 3 (Illustration of the Possible Effect of the Duty to Make
Reasonable Efforts on Plaintiff's Statistics).
204. See supra tbl. 3 (Illustration of the Possible Effect of the Duty to Make
Reasonable Efforts on Plaintiff's Statistics).
205. EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §
1607.4(D) (2003).
206. See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
207. Although not a disparate impact case, Hazelwood School District v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), dealt primarily with issues regarding the relevant labor
pool. In that case, the United States brought suit against the Hazelwood, Missouri
School District for employment discrimination against African-American applicants
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to make reasonable efforts is not too great a departure from current
disparate impact law. For example, in Dothard,plaintiffs alleged that
Alabama's height and weight requirements for prison guards had a
disparate impact using statistics regarding the heights and weights of
men and women throughout the United States.2" 8 Defendants argued
that these statistics were incorrect and therefore not probative of
disparate impact because the "generalized national statistics should
not suffice to establish a prima facie case."20 9 Defendants claimed that
plaintiffs should have used "comparative statistics concerning actual
applicants for correctional counselor positions in Alabama."21 0 The
court determined that plaintiff's statistics were admissible because
plaintiff's "reliance on general population demographic data was not
misplaced where there was no reason to suppose that physical height
and weight characteristics of Alabama men and women differ
markedly from those of the national population."2"'
The relevant baseline number2 2 is the central issue in both relevant
labor pool disputes and duty to make reasonable efforts disputes.213
With regard to the duty to make reasonable efforts, defendants could
argue that the labor pool against which disparities should be measured
was not all applicants, but only those applicants who took reasonable
steps to meet the hiring requirement. This would presumably cause
the percentage to increase and therefore be closer to the higher
percentage against which it was being compared.1 4
2 5
For example, consider the facts of Lanning.
Imagine that sixty
out of one hundred men passed the running test while only fifteen out
of fifty women passed. The comparison would be the sixty percent
pass rate for men compared with a thirty percent pass rate for women.
These numbers would probably be sufficient to show that plaintiffs
had met their initial burden of showing disparate impact.1 6 There
would be a statistical showing of disparate impact under the EEOC's
four-fifths rule, 17 as the pass rate for women is fifty percent of the

for teaching positions. Id. at 301. One of the arguments over the statistics was
whether the relevant labor market included the city of St. Louis, in which the
percentage of qualified African-Americans was substantially higher than the number
of qualified African-Americans in the suburban area of Hazelwood. Id. at 310-12. See
also Larson, supra note 10, § 22.07; supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
208. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977).
209. Id. at 330.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See supra notes 200-06 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
baseline number concept.
213. See generally Larson, supra note 10, § 22.07.
214. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 106-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
216. EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employment Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §
1607.4(D) (2003).
217. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.

20041

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

2709

pass rate for men. The burden would then shift to the employer to
show a business justification for the running test. 218 However, rather

than accepting these statistics, the employer could argue that the
evidence showed that many of the women did not take the steps
within their power to pass the running test. Thus, the plaintiffs'
statistics are misleading in that they do not reflect the applicants' true
ability to pass the test. In other words, the employer would argue that
the statistics should account for the women who did not make efforts
to pass the test.
Suppose the employer had evidence that only thirty of the fifty
women who took the test made reasonable efforts to train for the test.
In that case, the relevant percentages for comparison would be the
sixty percent pass rate for men compared to a fifty percent pass rate
for women, which would probably be insufficient to show disparate
impact, because in this case the pass rate for women would be 83.3%
of that of men.2" 9 Under the four-fifths rule, there would be no
showing of a disparate impact.220 However, if those other twenty
women did train reasonably hard and still failed to pass the test, they
would have been included in the baseline number, which would result
in no change in the overall pass rate, and thus would support a
conclusion of disparate impact under the four-fifths rule. Although
requiring these twenty women to make reasonable efforts to pass the
test would have been futile-in the sense that their pass rates would
not have increased-it would have had the effect of eliminating these
twenty non-triers from the baseline of women applicants, thus
ensuring that the female pass rate statistics better reflect applicants'
true ability to pass the test.2 2' Without statistics reflecting the
applicants' true ability to pass, the possibility exists that the employer
would be held liable, not for implementing a hiring requirement with
a discriminatory effect, but for plaintiffs' failure to take reasonable
steps to meet that requirement.
Implementing the duty at this stage of the litigation would be
218. Larson, supra note 10, § 23.04 ("Once a disparate impact is demonstrated, the
defendant may also prevail by persuading the court that the challenged practice is 'job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity."' (citations
omitted)).
219. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D).
220. Id.
221. If those twenty women trained reasonably hard, resulting in a pass rate of fifty
percent for those women, the result would be the same as if those women had not
been included in the baseline number at all. All of the women would have made
reasonable efforts and therefore the baseline number would be fifty. Twenty-five
women would have passed and therefore the fifty percent pass rate for women would
be compared to the sixty percent pass rate for men and there would be no evidence of
disparate impact under the four-fifths rule. Id. Again, requiring the women to train
reasonably hard would not have been futile insofar as this requirement is necessary to
determine their true ability to pass the test so that the relevant percentages for
comparison would reflect that ability.
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consistent with the Civil Rights Act of 1991.222 The Civil Rights Act of
1991 does not specify what type of statistics the plaintiff must show as
evidence of disparate impact. 2 3 Thus, integrating the duty at this
stage would not run contrary to the statute.
b. FederalRule of Civil Procedure23 in Class Actions
Disparate impact cases may be brought by individuals or as class
actions. 24 Many disparate impact cases have been brought as class
actions.2 5 In the case of disparate impact claims brought as class
actions, the duty to make reasonable efforts could also be integrated
into the disparate impact model in the form of class certification.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), which sets out the
prerequisites for class certification, "[o]ne or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if...
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class.
,226 If the representative of the
class did not take the steps within his or her power to mitigate
disparate impact, then his or her claim may not be typical of the class's
claim as a whole. Similarly, if the representative plaintiffs made
efforts to meet the hiring requirement, while there is evidence that the
remainder of the class, in whole or part, did not make reasonable
efforts, then the representative of the class may not have a claim that
is typical of the class. If it were found that the representatives of the
class did not have claims typical of the class based on the duty to make
reasonable efforts, then the class would not be certified and the
litigation would not continue (at least as a class action).
For example, in Lanning, the class of plaintiffs may never have been
certified if it had been determined that the representative plaintiffs'
claims were not typical of those of the class as a whole (women
applicants). Or perhaps the class would have been smaller because it
comprised only the women who fulfilled the duty to make reasonable

222. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
223. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (asserting a class action);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (asserting a class action); Malave v.
Potter, 320 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 2003) (asserting an individual claim of disparate impact
for race discrimination in connection with a denial of promotion); Bennett v. Roberts,
295 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2002) (asserting an individual claim of disparate treatment
based on alleged race discrimination in a School District's hiring practices); Alfano v.
Costello, 294 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2002) (asserting an individual claim of disparate impact
against the New York State Department of Correctional Services for sex
discrimination); Lanning v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999)
(asserting a class action); Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc., 773 F.2d 561 (4th Cir. 1985)
(asserting a class action).
225. See Rutherglen, supra note 22, at 55-57; see also supra note 224 and
accompanying text.
226. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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efforts. In that situation, the defendant would not need to contest the
statistics plaintiffs used to make out their prima facie case because the
baseline number would necessarily include only those plaintiffs who
complied with the duty. If it were found that none of the women in
the class took the steps within their power to prepare for the test, then
either the class would be certified or the plaintiffs would be barred
from recovery.
If the duty were integrated into the disparate impact model in this
way, it would prevent class members who did not take the steps within
their power to meet the requirement from recovering by hiding their
claims behind those of the class representatives who may have. It
would assure that plaintiffs who did not comply with the duty would
not be permitted to slip through the cracks.
However, this implementation of the duty does not operate in
disparate impact cases brought by individuals. Although disparate
impact claims have been frequently brought as class actions, 27
implementing the duty to make reasonable efforts in this manner
would not improve the disparate impact doctrine in individual cases.
In addition, such implementation may be administratively inefficient
in the sense that the issue may have to be litigated twice. If the
representatives of the class made the same general efforts, then the
class would be certified and the issue of whether reasonable efforts
were made may have to be litigated later to determine whether the
standard was met.228 However, this method may also be efficient. If
all plaintiffs did not make reasonable efforts, then the case would not
continue.
2. Creating a New Disparate Impact Model
The duty to make efforts might also be put into practice by
changing the present structure of the disparate impact model. The
duty could be implemented as a requirement that plaintiffs have the
burden of proof and persuasion to demonstrate as part of their prima
facie case. Or the duty could be put into practice by making it an
affirmative defense that employers have the burdens of proof and
persuasion to show after plaintiffs have made their prima facie case.
a. The Duty to Make Efforts as Partof Plaintiffs' Prima Facie Case
The duty to make efforts could be implemented by placing the
burden on plaintiffs to show that they made reasonable efforts to
comply with the hiring criteria. Under this model, proving reasonable
efforts would be part of the plaintiffs' prima facie case and plaintiffs
227. See Rutherglen, supra note 22, at 55-57.
228. However, some of the evidence used at the class certification stage may be
used later as well.
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would have the burdens of production and persuasion to show that
they made reasonable efforts in order to shift the burdens onto
defendants to show business necessity.229 Plaintiffs' failure to show
that they made reasonable efforts would be a bar to recovery.
This implementation of the duty would answer the concerns of
disparate impact critics who believe that hiring should be based on
merit as defined by past conduct and applicants' success with regard to
employers' hiring requirements.2 3 Thus, the burden would be on
plaintiffs to show in every case that they made efforts to comply with
the hiring requirement at issue.
This implementation of the duty to make efforts is appealing for
several reasons. First, it would prevent unjust results where plaintiffs
would recover despite not having taken the steps reasonably within
their power to comply with the hiring requirement. Second, plaintiffs,
for practical reasons, are in the best position to plead this portion of
the case.
Plaintiffs would have better access to evidence and
information because they would know best what they did or did not
do. Although discovery would also allow defendants to obtain this
information, it would be more efficient for plaintiffs to plead this as
part of their prima facie case.
However, this implementation of the duty may be also be inefficient
in that it would require that the issue of reasonable efforts be litigated
regardless of whether the record showed that it was material. It may
be in the interest of both defendants and plaintiffs to make disparate
impact litigation as efficient as possible because disparate impact suits
are expensive, time consuming, and difficult to win. 31
b. The Duty to Make Efforts as a Defense for Employers
The duty may also be applied as a defense available to defendants
during the second stage of the litigation (following the plaintiffs'
prima facie case).232 After plaintiffs have made their prima facie
case, 233 defendants could have an optional defense of showing that
plaintiffs did not make reasonable efforts to take the steps within their
power to meet the hiring requirement and that the defendant should
therefore not be liable for employment discrimination. Under this

229. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 25-29, 129-32 and accompanying text.
231. Plaintiffs are bringing fewer and fewer class claims of disparate impact, as they
require a great deal of resources and are thus increasingly difficult to win. See John J.
Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
DiscriminationLitigation, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983, 998 (1991) (discussing the causes and
effects of the changes in the nature of employment discrimination litigation in federal
courts from 1964 to 1991); see also Rutherglen, supra note 22, at 71-72.
232. See Larson, supra note 10, § 23.01.
233. Id. § 21.01.
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model, defendants would have the burden of production and
persuasion to plead this defense.
This option places a relatively lighter burden on plaintiffs, in that
the employer will have to prove that plaintiffs did not make efforts to
comply with the hiring requirement. If the employer fails to carry this
burden, then plaintiffs will prevail. Thus, plaintiffs may win even if
they were not able to prove that they did make efforts to comply, so
long as the employer does not have enough proof to show that
plaintiffs did not make efforts to do so. Placing the burden of proof
and production on defendants may be inefficient because the
employer may not have the access to the information it needs to plead
the defense successfully. However, the employer may gain access to
this information through the discovery process. This fact may also
work in favor of plaintiffs because defendants cannot make use of the
defense unless they can come up with enough evidence to show
plaintiffs did not meet their obligation under the duty. In the case
that they cannot, plaintiffs will prevail on this issue. In addition,
defendants will probably only be successful in this defense in cases
where it is clear that plaintiffs did not make reasonable efforts. Thus,
this formulation may protect against unjust results, while not placing
too heavy a burden on plaintiffs. In addition, this issue would not
need to be litigated unless it was a material issue, thereby decreasing
litigation expenses, especially for plaintiffs who generally have fewer
resources.
C. The DisparateImpact Doctrine Should Include a Duty to Make
Reasonable Efforts
Part III.C. argues that disparate impact law should be strengthened
and improved by implementing a duty to make reasonable efforts.
This duty will prevent plaintiffs from bringing successful disparate
impact claims without making reasonable efforts to meet the hiring
requirement at issue, thereby helping to ensure that employment
practices are merit-based, while still accounting for important societal
factors that prevent equal access to employment opportunities. In
support of this argument, Part III.C. shows that the duty to make
reasonable efforts improves upon the disparate impact doctrine, that
it does not implicate a similar duty in the disparate treatment context,
and that it is consistent with mitigation principles in other areas of the
law and with the original formulation of disparate impact laid out in
Griggs.
1. The Duty to Make Efforts Should Be Defined as a Duty to Make
Reasonable Efforts
The duty to make efforts should be defined to require that plaintiffs
make reasonable efforts (in light of the circumstances) to meet the
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hiring requirement at issue. 34 Defining the duty in this way takes into
account historical, social and economic factors that may make a hiring
requirement technically, but not practically possible for plaintiffs to
meet. 235 This definition prevents the harsh and unpalatable results of
the absolute duty to make efforts,236 while protecting against the
injustices of having no duty to make efforts (where plaintiffs may
bring a successful disparate impact claim without having made efforts
to meet the hiring requirement at issue). Thus, the duty to make
reasonable efforts prevents abuse of the disparate impact doctrine,
while acknowledging that historical, social and economic factors,
which perpetuate past discrimination, are exactly the barriers that the
theory of disparate impact was intended to remove.237
One might argue that the duty to make reasonable efforts is too
vague and fact-specific to lead to consistent and predictable results.
Thus, plaintiffs will not know what steps they must take to preserve
their right to bring a disparate impact claim. The duty to make
reasonable efforts is fact-specific, however, it must be in order to
ensure that courts adequately account for the unique historical, social
and economic forces affecting plaintiffs and their ability to make
efforts to meet hiring requirements.2 38 While analysis on a case-bycase basis may not be as predictable as a bright-line rule, courts and
plaintiffs have been able to deal successfully with predictability issues
in the context of the duty to mitigate damages in tort and contract
cases. 239 In these cases, courts must determine on a case-by-case basis
what steps are reasonable for plaintiffs to take in order to mitigate
their damages. 24' Thus, there is strong evidence that courts can
successfully administer a case-by-case analysis of reasonableness that
will permit future plaintiffs to act accordingly. Once it is determined
that the duty to make efforts is best defined as a duty to make
reasonable efforts, the costs of this duty must be allocated.
2. Only Employers Found Liable for Employment Discrimination
Should Bear the Costs of the Duty to Make Reasonable Efforts
The employer should bear the costs of plaintiffs' reasonable efforts
to comply in the event that the employer is found liable for
234. See supra Part II.B.3.
235. See Banks, supra note 32, at 1046.
236. See supra Part III.A. and tbl. 2 (Summary of Test Suites Results) and
accompanying text for an illustration of the absolute duty's harsh results when applied
to the facts of Griggs and the no duty to make efforts rule's unjust results when
applied to the facts of Lanning.
237. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428-30 (1971). See also supra
note 83 and accompanying text for a statement of the purpose of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991.
238. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
239. See infra notes 294-307 and accompanying text.
240. See infra note 299 and accompanying text.

2004]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

2715

employment discrimination.2 41 If the employer is not found liable, the
general rule that the applicant bears the costs of obtaining
employment should apply. This rule results in applicants incurring
different levels of costs; however, applicants generally bear the costs
of seeking employment, even though those costs might be higher for
some applicants than others. The employer's liability is the sole
justification for imposing the costs of reasonable compliance on the
employer. If an employer is found liable, it is in the interest of
fairness that it should bear the plaintiff's cost of reasonable
compliance. The plaintiff should not have to absorb costs incurred to
meet a requirement that disadvantaged him or her. This allocation of
costs gives the plaintiff the incentive to incur the costs that accompany
reasonable compliance even if he or she feels that the employment
requirement disadvantages him or her and members of his or her
protected group. In addition, it gives employers incentive to design
employment requirements that will not result in a disparate impact
and/or that will not cause members of a particular group to incur
excessive costs in making reasonable efforts to meet hiring
requirements.
3. The Duty to Make Reasonable Efforts Should Be Implemented as
a Tool for Defendants to Use in Contesting Plaintiffs' Statistics
The duty to make reasonable efforts should be integrated into the
present disparate impact model by giving defendant employers the
opportunity to contest plaintiffs' statistics during the first stage of
litigation.242 This implementation of the duty has a number of critical
advantages.
First, it is consistent with the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and current
case law. This implementation would not require a revision of
disparate impact through legislation or the overruling of any case law,
both of which could be arduous tasks.243 It is in line with the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which does not specify what type of statistics
plaintiffs must present to make their prima facie case. 244 It is also
consistent with the no-quota provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
because it promotes merit-based hiring. 245 Additionally, it is in line
with current case law because the issue of defining the appropriate
241. See supra Part II.B.4.
242. See supra Part III.B.1.a.
243. This implementation of the duty would be more efficient if the political battles
and compromises that took place during the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
could be avoided. See generally Roger Clegg, A Brief Legislative History of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 54 La. L. Rev. 1459 (1994) (giving a history of the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
244. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
245. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2000); see also supra note 27 and accompanying
text.
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baseline number is already a frequently litigated issue in the context

of determining
the relevant labor pool for each disparate impact
24 6

case.

Second, this implementation of the duty is economically and

administratively efficient. It would not put an extra or undue burden
on either party or the courts because the issue would not need to be

litigated unless it was material. Further, the parties already must
litigate the issue of the relevant baseline number under current case
law.247 Whether plaintiffs' statistics accurately reflect their true ability
to meet the hiring requirement may be determined early in the
litigation. If, taking into consideration plaintiffs' reasonable efforts to

comply, the court determines that there is no disparate impact under
the four-fifths rule,248 the litigation would not need to proceed to the
business justification stage. 249 Thus, the duty to make reasonable
efforts should be considered when litigating the issue of whether

plaintiff has presented statistics sufficient to make out a prima facie
case of disparate impact.
4. The Duty to Make Reasonable Efforts as a Defense of Disparate

Impact
The duty to make reasonable efforts should be incorporated into
the disparate impact model because it would improve and strengthen

the theory. Disparate impact is an important vehicle for achieving
equality in employment.2 0 Discriminatory employment practices
frequently exist in the absence of evidence of discriminatory intent.251
Often employers are unaware of their own biases and may act on
them subconsciously. 2 2 Therefore, even when an employer does not
have a discriminatory motive, the employer's actions may still have a
negative and disproportionate effect on a particular group.253 In
246. See supra notes 207, 213 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
248. EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §
1607.4(D) (2003).
249. See supra notes 54-55, 88 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
251. See Bennett-Alexander, supra note 34, at 196 ("[O]vert discrimination may
have waned after the enactment [of] Title VII, [but] covert and 'unintentional'
discrimination remain[] alive and well, and in need of redress.").
252. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev.
1161, 1164 (1995) ("[T]he way in which Title VII jurisprudence constructs
discrimination, while sufficient to address the deliberate discrimination prevalent in
an earlier age, is inadequate to address the subtle, often unconscious forms of bias
that Title VII was also intended to remedy."); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev.
317, 318-21 (1987) (analyzing the discriminatory purpose doctrine created by the
Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
253. Justin D. Cummins, Refashioning the Disparate Treatment and Disparate
Impact Doctrines in Theory and in Practice, 41 How. L.J. 455, 468-69 (1998)
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addition, even if an employer has a discriminatory motive, that motive
may be difficult to prove. 254 As openly discriminatory "behavior has
become more unfashionable, evidence of intent has become harder to
find.
But this does not mean that racial discrimination has
disappeared. '25 5 Given these difficulties and disparate impact's role in
overcoming them, the disparate impact doctrine should be refined,
improved, and strengthened so that it may best serve its purpose of
paving a way toward equality in employment. Thus, the duty to make
reasonable efforts should be incorporated into the disparate impact
doctrine to protect against the injustice that results when a plaintiff
wins a disparate impact case without having made reasonable efforts
to meet the employment criteria at issue.256 The duty to make
reasonable efforts would help to ensure that employment practices are
merit-based, while acknowledging the societal factors that prevent
equal access to employment opportunities.
A duty to make reasonable efforts would serve important functions
in disparate impact law. First, it would help courts to determine
whether there is a disparate impact and, if so, its severity. 25 7 The duty
to make reasonable efforts helps to ensure that the statistics that
plaintiffs use to show their prima facie case reflect plaintiffs' true
ability to meet a hiring requirement, and protects employers from
being held liable for implementing hiring criteria that would not have
had a disparate impact if plaintiffs had made reasonable efforts to
meet it. Without a duty to make reasonable efforts, it can be difficult
to determine whether plaintiffs failed to meet a facially neutral hiring
requirement because the requirement had a negative impact on them,
or because they simply did not make efforts to comply with the
requirement." 8 Thus, the duty also protects against unjust results,
which occur when plaintiffs are able to recover based on hiring criteria
that they did not make efforts to meet.2 9
Second, the duty to make reasonable efforts will act as an incentive

("[R]acism and discrimination infect the unconscious as well as the conscious."); e.g.,
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454 (1982) (holding that a nondiscriminatory
"bottom line" is not a defense to a disparate impact claim under Title VII).
254. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
255. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290) (holding
that the plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act
could not be rebutted by the landlord's hypothetical reasons for rejecting the
plaintiff).
256. See, e.g., supra notes 106-20 and accompanying text.
257. See supra Part III.B.1.a. for a discussion of how a duty to make efforts could
improve the reliability of the statistics that plaintiffs use to make their prima facie
case.
258. See supra notes 106-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lanning as
an example of a case in which it is difficult to determine whether it was plaintiffs' lack
of efforts or the running test itself that caused the statistical disparity.
259. See, e.g., supra notes 106-20 and accompanying text.
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to plaintiffs to make efforts to comply with hiring criteria. Giving
plaintiffs this incentive has the benefit of allowing courts to determine
whether any disparate impact is the result of a hiring requirement with
a discriminatory effect or the result of plaintiffs' failure to take steps
to meet the hiring requirement. If a plaintiff feels that a requirement
may be discriminatory, that plaintiff may not have the incentive to
meet it if he or she can still win a disparate impact claim based on that
requirement. A duty to make reasonable efforts would give plaintiffs
an incentive to make reasonable efforts, which would, in turn, make
statistical determinations of disparate impact more accurate. 6 °
Third, without a duty to make reasonable efforts, employers have
an incentive to focus more on the pass rates of applicants than on the
quality of their hiring requirements. If employers know that they
could be found liable for disparate impact regardless of how sensitive
their requirements were to minority groups, employers would be
encouraged to focus only on the pass rates of applicants (which might
lead to quotas), rather than on devising quality employment
requirements designed to avoid disadvantaging particular groups.26 If
an employer knows it may be held liable for a disparity that occurs
even when the applicant could have passed with minimal effort, it will
have only a few options to avoid liability. It could hire the applicant
despite his or her refusal to meet the demands; or it could lower the
test standards (so that everyone could pass without training) and
thereby decrease the quality of its workforce.2 62 From an employer's
perspective, neither of these options results in desirable outcomes.
Fourth, the duty to make reasonable efforts encourages merit-based
employment practices and protects against quotas. Such a duty
promotes hiring based on merit, in that an applicant's motivation and
effort in complying with hiring criteria may be strongly indicative of
the motivation and effort that they will exhibit in carrying out their
job in the future.2 63 Thus, the duty protects against the institution of
quotas2 64 because it ensures that the employer will not be made to hire
applicants of a particular group if they have not made efforts to
comply with their requirements over applicants who have made
efforts.
Finally, a duty to make reasonable efforts comports with notions of
fairness and deservingness, in that those who try harder should be
rewarded and treated more favorably than those who do not because

260. The statistics would be more accurate in the sense that they reflected
plaintiffs' true ability to meet the hiring requirement.
261. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the
argument against quotas in the hiring context.
262. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
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it promotes productivity. 265
Generally, the legal system holds
defendants liable only when they have acted culpably, meaning that

their actions caused harm to plaintiffs.266 If plaintiffs have not made
efforts to meet a hiring requirement, it is difficult to determine
whether the defendant has caused the harm under this disparate
impact theory.267 Therefore, holding that defendant liable may be

unjust.
Obtaining employment almost always requires that one make

efforts to meet job requirements. Generally, people feel that it is fair
that those who try harder obtain employment over those who make

less or no effort.2 68 It is simply not fair to bring a complaint about a

hiring requirement that plaintiff did not make efforts to meet. Society
also has an interest in treating those who try harder more favorably
than those who do not because those who try are likely to be more
valuable and productive members of society.2 69 One should not claim

that a task is too difficult or disadvantages him or her without making
a good faith effort to complete that task successfully.

Therefore,

fairness dictates that plaintiffs make an effort to do what is required of
them when seeking employment before they bring suit claiming that
the requirement had a discriminatory effect on them.
5. The Duty to Make Reasonable Efforts Does Not Implicate a Duty

to Mitigate Disparate Treatment
One might argue that if a duty to make reasonable efforts is needed
in disparate impact law, a similar duty should be implemented in
disparate treatment law. However, the proposed ex ante duty to
make reasonable efforts for disparate impact law does not carry over
265. See infra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
266. There are many instances of strict liability; however, generally, whether courts
will award relief to plaintiffs is contingent on finding the defendant liable.
267. See supra Part III.B.l.a.
268. Distributive justice supports this conception of fairness and deservingness. "In
distributive justice, things are allocated to persons in accordance with a criterion of
distribution." Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to
DistributiveJustice, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 515, 526, 535 (1992) (attempting to "explain the
nature and basis of corrective justice without referring in any way to distributive
considerations"). In a merit system, the criterion of distribution is past conduct and
efforts in meeting the hiring requirement. See Banks, supra note 32, at 1036. These
criteria are chosen because they promote efficiency and productivity. Id. Individuals
may be unequal; however, they are treated equally if employment is offered to them
on the basis of their past conduct and efforts in meeting the hiring requirements. See
Benson, supra, at 535-36. Thus,
[e]ach person's share will then be according to the extent of his or her
qualification under the criteri[a] [of past conduct and efforts in meeting the
hiring requirement]. If shares are different, this will reflect differences
among persons that are relevant in light of the criteri[a]. Equality consists
here in there being a proportion ....
Id. at 536.
269. See Banks, supra note 32, at 1036-37.
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to the disparate treatment context. A duty to make reasonable efforts
would be inappropriate in the disparate treatment context because (1)
such a duty would not further the goals of Title VII, 27° and (2) because
there is no evidence of intentional discrimination in disparate impact
cases, while there is in treatment cases, which negates the need for a
duty to make reasonable efforts.271
A duty to make reasonable efforts in the disparate treatment
context would require plaintiffs to show that they made reasonable
efforts to mitigate the existence of intentional discrimination. For
example, an African-American plaintiff might be required to refrain
from applying for employment with a company that he or she knows
intentionally discriminates against African-Americans. Instead he or
she should seek employment with another company that does not
discriminate if it is within his or her ability to do so. Similarly, a
plaintiff may be required to quit a job at which he or she is being
discriminated against and find employment elsewhere if it is within his
or her power. This requirement is patently unjust. It does little to
give employers incentive to implement equal employment practices.
It also penalizes the plaintiff for the employer's discrimination.
Rather than working towards equality in employment, it encourages
applicants to avoid employers that have discriminatory
hiring
272
practices. These are clearly not the goals of Title VII.
Further, the critical difference between disparate treatment and
disparate impact is that there is evidence of intent to discriminate in
disparate treatment cases. 273 The duty to make reasonable efforts is
aimed at finding liability only where it was the employer's
requirement, and not the plaintiff's failure to make efforts, that
resulted in his or her failure to meet the requirement.2 74 If the
employer had the intent to discriminate, then there is no concern that
the employer will be found liable for the lack of effort on plaintiff's
270. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451 (1982) ("Title VII strives to achieve
equality of opportunity by rooting out 'artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary'
employer-created barriers to professional development that have a discriminatory
impact upon individuals.").
271. See Larson, supra note 10, § 20.03; see also supra notes 9-42 and accompanying
text.
272. See EEOC v. Chi. Club, 86 F.3d 1423, 1434 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he overriding
goal of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to eliminate discrimination and to create
disincentives to discriminate .... "); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
There is a duty to mitigate damages in both disparate impact and treatment cases. See
infra note 311 and accompanying text. For instance, a plaintiff would be required to
find another comparable job if he or she were fired, however, this duty does not run
contrary to the goals of Title VII because it only prevents the defendant's damages
from piling up, and does not act as a bar to liability. See infra Part III.C.6.b. discussing
the differences between the duty to mitigate damages and the duty to make
reasonable efforts.
273. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text; see also Larson, supra note 10, §
20.03.
274. See supra Part II.B.3.
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part because the plaintiff would have been rejected on account of her
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 275 even if he or she had
made reasonable efforts. The employer's intent to discriminate
justifies its being held liable. 276 Thus, there is no need for a duty to
make reasonable efforts in disparate treatment cases because there is
another means of finding employer liability: intent to discriminate.2 77
The duty to make reasonable efforts, therefore does not implicate an
analogous duty in disparate treatment cases.
While the ex ante duty to make reasonable efforts does not
implicate a corresponding ex post duty to mitigate disparate
treatment, the duty to make reasonable efforts is consistent with
established mitigation duties in other areas of the law.
6. The Duty to Make Reasonable Efforts Is Consistent with
Mitigation Principles in Other Areas of the Law
The duty to make reasonable efforts is in line with mitigation duties
in other areas of the law and therefore is not a great departure from
existing law.2 78 The duty to make reasonable efforts has important
similarities to and differences from other obligations in employment
discrimination law as well as other legal disciplines. Comparing the
duty to make reasonable efforts to similar obligations puts into focus
the need for such a duty, its goals, and its possible functions and
effects. The following sections compare the duty to make reasonable
efforts to the ability to comply standard in employment discrimination
cases based on employers' English-only rules, and the obligation to
mitigate damages in tort and contract law.
a. Ability to Comply Standard
The duty to make reasonable efforts is analogous to the "ability to
comply" standard applied in employment discrimination cases based
on English-only rules in the workplace with respect to bilingual
employees. 279 Numerous federal circuits have held that "English-only
275. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
276. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
277. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (noting that intent is
not necessary to finding discrimination under Title VII); Larson, supra note 10, §
20.03. "[I]n disparate treatment cases the plaintiff is ultimately attempting to show
that the employer acted with discriminatory intent. In disparate impact cases, the
plaintiff may prevail by showing the impact of the employer's practices; a showing of
discriminatory intent is not necessary." Id.
278. See infra Part III.C.6.a.
279. E.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266-67 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the
employer's rule prohibiting sales employees from speaking any language other than
English on the job did not constitute employment discrimination based on national
origin); Kania v. Archdiocese, 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 731-32 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that
the church's rule requiring employees to speak only English during business hours did
not constitute national-origin discrimination when applied to bilingual employees);
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policies are not discriminatory if the employees speak English and are
thus not disadvantaged in the job market. ' 28 ° Thus, employers do not
violate Title VII by disallowing employees, who also speak English, to
speak their native tongue on the job provided that the English-only
policy has a legitimate business purpose.281 Plaintiffs who are able, but
not willing to comply with English-only rules may not bring a
successful claim under Title VII.
This standard is analogous to the duty to make reasonable efforts in
that it requires employees to take steps within their power to meet an
employer's requirement. The courts view an employee's "choice of
language, like other behaviors, [as] a matter of [personal]
preference. '28 2 If there is clear evidence that plaintiffs failed to make
efforts to meet the English-only requirement (with which they could
comply because the record shows they speak English) then their
'
failure to comply with the rule was a "matter of choice."2 83
This
choice not to follow the English-only rule cannot be the basis for a
disparate impact claim because the "Act does not support an
interpretation that equates the language an employee prefers to use
with his national origin."' '2 4 Thus, bilingual employees who fail to
comply with English-only rules (and are subsequently discharged) are
not discharged because of an immutable characteristic, specifically
their national origin in violation of Title VII, but rather because of
their personal decision not to comply with the rule.285 It may be that
plaintiffs have limited English or inadvertently slip into speaking their
native tongue and therefore the requirement may be difficult to
comply with at times. However, their ability to comply bars a
disparate impact claim based on an English-only rule.286

Prado v. L. Luria & Son, Inc., 975 F. Supp 1349, 1352-54 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that
employer's English-only policy did not constitute national origin discrimination as
applied to bilingual employees); Long v. First Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933, 937-39
(E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that an employer's English-only policy did not amount to
national origin discrimination as applied to bilingual employees).
280. Long, 894 F. Supp. at 940; see Garcia,618 F.2d at 271.
281. Prado, 975 F. Supp. at 1354.
282. Id.
283. Kania, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 733 (quoting Garcia,618 F.2d at 270).
284. Garcia,618 F.2d at 270.
285. Id. at 272 ("Mr. Garcia was neither discharged because of his national origin
nor denied equal conditions of employment based on that factor; instead, he was
discharged because, having the ability to comply with his employer's rule, he did not
do so."). Thus Title VII does not "command[] employers to permit employees to
speak the tongue they prefer." Kania, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 734.
286. Some critics of the ability to comply standard have argued that it is unjust for
failing to take into account the "close connection between one's primary language
and one's ethnicity." Paul K. Hentzen, EEOC v. Syncro-Start Products: The New
Face of DisparateImpact Challenges to English-Only Workplace Rules, 69 UMKC L.
Rev. 439, 453 (2000). However, courts have held that "Title VII does not protect the
ability of workers to express their cultural heritage at the workplace." Kania, 14 F.
Supp. 2d at 736.

2004]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

2723

The ability to comply standard in the English-only workplace
context differs from the duty to make reasonable efforts in the case of
hiring requirements in two important ways. First, the evidence of
efforts to comply may not be as clear as in the case of English-only
rules. It would be easier to determine whether one is bilingual than to
determine whether, for instance, the plaintiff in Dothard made efforts
to meet the weight requirement. 8 7 Second and most importantly, the
duty to make reasonable efforts is not as stringent as the ability to
comply standard. The ability to comply standard dictates that because
plaintiffs can comply (regardless of the difficulty), they cannot prove
disparate impact.2 8 However, the duty to make reasonable efforts
requires only that plaintiffs make reasonable efforts to meet the hiring
requirement even if further steps are within their power, but are
unduly difficult to take. In other words, the ability to comply
standards bars a disparate impact claim regardless of how difficult it
may be for an employee to speak English only at designated times in
the workplace so long as that employee is bilingual. 289 The duty to
make reasonable efforts would not require that applicants take steps
to meet a hiring requirement that are unreasonably difficult to take. 90
Third, the ability to comply standard addresses the concern that
employers should be able to fashion rules that promote legitimate
business objectives. 29 1 Numerous courts have held that plaintiffs
should not be able to claim that these rules discriminate on the basis
of national origin if the rules are legitimate and plaintiffs make a
personal choice not to comply with them. 292 Conversely, English-only
rules as applied to employees who do not speak English can be
considered immutable characteristics and may be found to constitute a
discriminatory employment practice because employees do not choose
to violate them. 293 Like the ability to comply standard, the duty to
287. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
288. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 272 (finding that although it may have been difficult for
the plaintiff to comply with the English-only rule, his ability to comply barred his
disparate impact claim).
289. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
290. See supra Part II.B.3.
291. E.g., Kania, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 736. According to the court:
[IL]t
is clear that the Church adopted its English-only rule to improve
interpersonal relations at the Church, and to prevent Polish-speaking
employees from alienating other employees, and perhaps church members
themselves. The courts in Spun Steak, Gloor and Prado upheld the validity
of workplace English-only rules adopted for similar reasons. Accordingly,
the Court finds that in adopting the challenged rule, the Church had business
justification as a matter of law.
Id.
292. Garcia,618 F.2d at 264; Kania, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 730; Prado v. L. Luria & Son,
Inc., 975 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Long v. First Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933
(E.D. Va. 1995).
293. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 270 ("To a person who speaks only one tongue or to a
person who has difficulty using another language than the one spoken in his home,
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make reasonable efforts is concerned with employers being able to

fashion legitimate employment requirements without facing liability if
applicants make a determination, as a matter of personal preference,
not to take steps to meet them.
b. Duty to Mitigate Damages in Tort and ContractLaw

The duty to make reasonable efforts is also analogous to the
obligation to mitigate damages in both tort and contract law;
therefore, it does not diverge substantially from existing law. In the
tort and contract contexts, after the defendant's liability has been

established, plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages acts as a limitation
on the damages he or she may recover. 94 The Restatement (Second)
of Contracts states, "damages are not recoverable for loss that the
injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or

'
humiliation."295
Similarly, "one injured by the tort of another is not

entitled to recover damages for any harm that he could have avoided
by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure" after the tort has been
committed.2 96
The aim of the mitigation duty in both tort and contract law is to

give the plaintiff an incentive to limit his or her injuries where it is
within his or her power, rather than to let the amount of damages
mount because he or she knows that the defendant will bear the
cost.297 The goal is economic efficiency in that the total cost to society
of a tort or contract breach should be limited as much as possible. 9 s
Plaintiffs are only required to take reasonable measures to limit the

extent of their damages-they are not obligated to take any
burdensome or potentially harmful steps.2 99 The rule acknowledges
the defendant's culpability by requiring that he or she bear the cost of
any reasonable mitigation measures the plaintiff takes, whether or not
language might well be an immutable characteristic like skin color, sex or place of
birth.").
294. E.g., State Pub. Sch. Bldg. Auth. v. W.M. Anderson Co., 410 A.2d 1329, 1331
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) ("It is a familiar rule of law that a party who suffers a loss due
to a breach of contract has a duty to make reasonable efforts to mitigate his losses.").
295. Restatement (Second) of Contracts: Avoidability as a Limitation on Damages
§ 350(1) (1981).
296. Restatement (Second) of Torts: Avoidable Consequences § 918(1) (1979).
297. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 cmt. a.
298. Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 577 n.16 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[The] purposes of the
doctrine ... are to encourage plaintiffs to reduce the societal costs of their injuries
and to ensure fair treatment of defendants.").
299. Foust v. Valleybrook Realty Co., 446 N.E.2d 1122, 1127 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981)
("The rule requiring one injured by a wrongful act or omission of another to minimize
the damages resulting does not require a party to make extraordinary efforts, or to do
what is unreasonable or impracticable."); see Chandler v. Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp., 426 N.E.2d 521, 523 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (finding that there were issues of
material fact as to whether plaintiff could have reduced his losses with "reasonable
effort").
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these measures actually succeed in lowering the plaintiff's damages."

Further, "[t]he injured party is not precluded from recovery by the
rule.., to the extent that he has made reasonable but unsuccessful
mitigation,
efforts to avoid [the] loss."31 Thus, reasonable attempts3 at
°2
even if unsuccessful, do not limit the plaintiff's recovery.
The duty to make reasonable efforts may also be understood as a
duty to mitigate the effects of disparate impact. This duty has
important parallels to and differences from the obligation to mitigate
damages. These duties are similar in that they require a plaintiff to
take steps to lessen the harmful (or potentially harmful in the case of
the duty to make reasonable efforts) effects of the defendant's
actions.3" 3 Both duties require plaintiffs to make efforts to avoid

suffering an actual or potential harm, which they are capable of

preventing.3 °4 In the tort and contract context, this duty begins after a
defendant has harmed the plaintiff and liability has been found.30 5 It is
concerned with mitigating the ex post effects of the harm.30 6

Conversely, the duty to make reasonable efforts exists before there is
a finding of liability and may even influence whether or not a court
will find liability. It is concerned with mitigating the ex ante or
potential existence of a disparate impact. In this respect, the duty to
make reasonable efforts may be more justifiable because the plaintiff

is not necessarily preventing further loss to one who has already

harmed him or her,30 7 but rather taking steps to ensure that any harm
done is solely the fault of the employer and not attributable to the

300. CUNA Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth., No. B14
91200, 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 636, at *20 (Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2003) ("[T]he costs of
mitigation efforts are recoverable.., if they are reasonable and undertaken in good
faith; and ... it is 'irrelevant' that the mitigation efforts may have failed."); Mr. Eddie,
Inc. v. Ginsberg, 430 S.W.2d 5, 12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) ("If... expenses are the
result of a prudent attempt to minimize damages they are recoverable even though
the result is an aggravation of the damages rather than a mitigation."); Eugene
Kontorovich, Note, The Mitigation of Emotional DistressDamages, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev.
491, 496-99 (2001) (analyzing courts' failure to apply a mitigation rule to emotional
distress damages and proposing means by which courts can limit moral hazard in this
area without a mitigation rule).
301. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350(2).
302. Id. § 350 cmt. h.
303. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
305. See Int'l Paper Co. v. Androscoggin Energy L.L.C., No. 00 C 6215, 2003 U.S.
Dec. 11, 2003) (holding that the issue of
Dist. LEXIS 22404, at *10-*11, *14 (N.D. I11.
mitigation of damages and the calculation of damages in general cannot be made until
liability has been determined).
306. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 918 cmt. a (1979) (noting that "the rule
stated in this Section applies only to the diminution of damages and not to the
existence of a cause of action").
307. The duty to mitigate damages in the tort and contract contexts arises only
after the commission of the tort or the breach of a contract because it acts as a limit to
damages, which result from injury. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 (1981);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 918.

2726

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

plaintiff. The obligation to mitigate damages is also aimed at
compensating the plaintiff for only the harm that the defendant
caused, not any harm that the plaintiff caused him or herself (except
when the defendant and the plaintiff are both "but for" causes of the
harm). Similarly, the goal of the duty to make reasonable efforts is to
limit the possibility that a defendant will be held liable when the
plaintiff's failure to meet a hiring requirement was not the result of an
employer's discriminatory requirement, but rather the plaintiff's
failure to take steps to meet that requirement. Like the obligation to
mitigate damages, the duty to make reasonable efforts would only
require that plaintiffs make reasonable efforts to comply, and would
not bar recovery if those reasonable steps were unsuccessful.3 08
The obligation to mitigate damages in the tort or contractual
contexts differs from the duty to make reasonable efforts in that the
obligation to mitigate damages acts only as a limit to damages and not
to recovery, 0 9 while the duty to make reasonable efforts would be a
bar to finding liability. If a court finds that the plaintiff failed to
mitigate his or her damages, the court could limit the plaintiff's
recovery by the amount that he or she could have avoided by taking
reasonable steps to mitigate the damages.310 Plaintiffs in disparate
impact cases already have a duty to mitigate damages, in that if
plaintiffs do not get a job, plaintiffs must make reasonable efforts to
obtain other employment and refrain from running up the defendant's
damages where plaintiffs have reasonable power to limit them.3 '
Conversely, if a court were to find that a plaintiff failed to mitigate the
effects of disparate impact, this failure to mitigate would act as a
complete bar to recovery. This difference in results may be a reason
to define the duty to make reasonable efforts less stringently than the
obligation to mitigate damages.

308. See supra notes 301-02 and accompanying text.
309. The plaintiff "incurs no liability for his failure to [mitigate damages]. The
amount of loss that he could reasonably have avoided by stopping performance,
making substitute arrangements or otherwise is simply subtracted from the amount
that would otherwise have been recoverable as damages." Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 350 cmt. b.
310. E.g., Kallman v. Radioshack Corp., 315 F.3d 731, 740-42 (7th Cir. 2002)
(affirming the lower court's ruling that the plaintiff landlord failed to mitigate her
damages and limiting her damages based on that failure); Baker v. John Morrell &
Co., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1182 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (finding that plaintiff failed to
mitigate her damages).
311. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982) ("An unemployed
or underemployed claimant, like all other Title VII claimants, is subject to the
statutory duty to minimize damages set out in [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)]."); see also
United States v. City of Warren, 138 F.3d 1083, 1098 (6th Cir. 1998) ("A Title VII
claimant has a duty to mitigate damages by seeking substantially equivalent
employment.").
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c. The Duty to Make Reasonable Efforts Is Consistent with the
OriginalFormulationof the DisparateImpact Doctrine in Griggs
A duty to make reasonable efforts is also compatible with the
original formulation of the disparate impact doctrine in Griggs, which
was to remove barriers to employment that are the result of past
discrimination (not barriers to employment that plaintiffs have
created themselves).31
Courts and Congress could have read the
original formulation of disparate impact laid out in Griggs narrowly as
creating the theory of disparate impact as a temporary measure to be
used only where there had been a showing of "purposeful
discrimination in the past."3'13 The Court stated that, "[u]nder the
[Civil Rights] Act [of 1964], practices, procedures, or tests neutral on
their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if
they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices. 3 14 The Court explained that Congress's
purpose in enacting Title VII "was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to
favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
'
employees."3 15
In these passages, the Court described the aim of
disparate impact as eradicating the lingering present effects of past
discrimination.3 16 Under a narrow reading, disparate impact was
meant only to be a temporary means of stopping employment
discrimination while disparate treatment was being eliminated.
However, courts and Congress3" 7 did not read Griggs narrowly. The
theory of disparate impact grew and expanded into many areas of the
law, such as housing discrimination.3" 8
As originally exposited, the theory of disparate impact was not
intended to allow plaintiffs to bring successful claims without having
made efforts to comply with a hiring requirement, which they were
capable of meeting. Rather, disparate impact was intended to
"achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
312. See infra notes 313-20 and accompanying text.
313. See Gold, supra note 20, at 478 n.169.
314. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430 (1971).
315. Id. at 429-30.
316. See supra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
317. In 1991, through the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified
the theory of disparate impact that the Supreme Court developed in Griggs. See supra
notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
318. E.g., Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000)
(challenging a requirement that students live in co-educational residence halls as
discriminatory on the basis of religion under the Fair Housing Act); Pfaff v. U.S.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the landlord's
refusal to rent to a family of five did not constitute housing discrimination based on
familial status). See generally Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact:
DoctrinalReconstruction, Fair Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 47 Emory L. 409 (1998) (analyzing the disparate impact doctrine in the
context of fair housing law).
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that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group... over
other[s]."31 9 The original goal was to eliminate the lingering effects of
prior discrimination,3 20 not of the failure to take steps to comply with a
hiring requirement when it was within one's power to do so. This lack
of effort is clearly not the type of barrier that disparate impact was
intended to overcome. If applicants know that they may be able to
sue without making any effort to meet the hiring requirement at issue,
disparate impact liability may heighten current barriers to equal
employment opportunity.
If disparate impact gives already
disadvantaged plaintiffs an incentive not to work hard because they
may obtain employment anyway, it may actually be doing more harm
than good.
CONCLUSION

Disparate impact is an essential and powerful tool with which to
fight discrimination and achieve equality in employment. Ensuring
that barriers to equal employment opportunities are lifted is a vital
societal goal. Achieving this goal requires acknowledging individuals'
status as members of disadvantaged groups and working to undo
those disadvantages. Incorporating the duty to make reasonable
efforts into the theory of disparate impact will both enhance and
strengthen the doctrine, thus ensuring that the theory is not abused
and remains in place for the benefit of victims of employment
discrimination and for society as a whole.

319. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
320. See supra notes 313-18 and accompanying text.

